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Abstract 
This dissertation examined the public language of U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin to assess how they frame modern crises. Both the United States and 
Russia have experienced internal turmoil, social discord, political and economic instability, and 
international conflict since the termination of their hostilities three decades ago. Helming the 
presidential offices of these great powers, self-described strongmen Donald Trump and Vladimir 
Putin nostalgically promise to restore the lost glories of their respective countries while making 
mawkish appeals to tribal identities to build popular support for authoritarian tendencies and 
practices; preying on popular yearning for stability in a time of uncertainty. This oscillation 
between the past and future, occupying an uncomfortable and uncertain position, described as 
Metamodernism, has emerged as a response to the crises of the 21st century, magnified by the 
hyper-connection and subjectivities created by modern telecommunications technology. Using 
documentary content analysis of the public speeches and statements of Trump and Putin, this 
dissertation examined how the two leaders, proxies for the elites of their respective countries, 
framed the challenges of the Metamodern Era to advance their authoritarian political agendas. 
The study found that Trump represented deconstructive Metamodernism and Putin signified 
constructive Metamodernism; both processes to emplace an authoritarian state in either a 
democratic state or a fragile state. The findings in this research have implications for 
international relations theory, democracy research, and conflict resolution studies.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Emergence of the Metamodern Moment 
For the United States, the 20th Century opened with a devastating and shocking terrorist 
attack by Al Qaeda in New York City and Washington D.C. that killed approximately 3,000 
people, leaving both a physical scar at the scenes of the horror and a disfiguring psychological 
wound on the national spirit. The American government retaliated first with the invasion of 
Afghanistan to uproot the safe haven of Al Qaeda and then followed with the subjugation of Iraq, 
resulting in the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s government and the obliteration of that 
country’s internal peace and stability1. By the end of the first decade of the century, over one 
million people died during the War on Terrorism2, the Great Recession threatened global 
economic stability, and tremendous social change in the United States, marked by the election of 
the country’s first black president, intensified internal political conflict. 
Simultaneously, Russia emerged from the chaos of the 1990s, impoverished and depleted 
by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a more confident state power with international ambitions 
to restore its role as a leading global contender. Its president, a former secret police officer, 
Vladimir Putin, promised to strengthen the country by imposing internal order and confronting  
external enemies (Myers, 2016). Like the United States, Russia’s start of the 20th Century also 
included war: an assault on the de facto independent Chechen Republic, a mountainous redoubt 
 
1 For more information regarding the 9/11 attacks, refer to the 9/11 Commission Report, which examines in detail 
the events leading up to September 11, 2001, how the attack unfolded, and the American policy and military 
response. The commission concluded that 2,973 Americans were killed in the attack. As early as the evening of 
September 11, the National Security Council discussed military retaliation against Al Qaeda and those that harbored 
the organization, when then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld recommended that the administration consider 
action against Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Iran.   
2 Estimates vary about the total lives lost during the War on Terror. The Watson Institute of International and Public 
Affairs at Brown University estimated that 480,000 to 507,000 people (including U.S military personnel, 
contractors, civilians, and opposition fighters, among others) were killed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq between 
October 2001 and October 2018. In contrast, the Physicians for Social Responsibilty estimated that 1.3 million 
people were killed in those same three countries, with as many as one million Iraqis killed as early as 2008 (five 
years after the U.S. invasion).  
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of nationalist and Islamist fighters in the Caucasus region, as revenge for Russia’s embarrassing 
military defeat in the prior decade. But the pretext for this war, a series of apartment bombings 
that killed hundreds of people, stirred controversy for the lingering suspicion that the Russian 
intelligence services, noted for their historical brutality and deceptions, planted the explosive 
devices themselves3. Nevertheless, as the decade continued, Putin consolidated control of the 
government by arresting and murdering political rivals, journalists, and dissidents, and launched 
further revanchist wars in Georgia and Ukraine, culminating in the country’s isolation from the 
international community (Knight, 2017).  
The first decade of the century, a period that at first mixed both promises for a so-called 
end of history and insecurities like Y2K, instead ushered in unexpected turmoil, conflict, and 
violence. Combined with the international turbulence and domestic disorder, the new century 
also introduced new technologies that connected people the world over like never before. Smart 
phones enabled people to consolidate many traditionally separate functions – like 
communication, photography, and the internet – into one handheld device while social media 
platforms globalized the world rapidly and irreversibly. These new tools of interconnectedness 
fostered cross-cultural communication, artisanal and commercial profit, and social and political 
revolutions. They provided a new, dynamic battlefield on which elites and grassroots movements 
engaged in decades-old wars of culture, identity, and politics. Alarmingly, they also enabled the 
 
3 Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko examined the apartment bombings and described them as a false flag 
operation by the Russian government in their book Blowing Up Russia. In September 1999, a succession of bombs 
exploded in four apartment buildings across Russia. After the first four attacks, an alert resident in the city of 
Ryazan observed suspicious men carrying bags into his apartment building’s basement. After the local police 
responded, they discovered a cache of explosives wired to detonate. Within a day, the Russian police arrested the 
suspects, all of whom produced identity cards of the Federal Security Service (FSB). After their release, the FSB 
director claimed that the individuals had participated in an exercise to evaluate local responses. Litvinenko, a former 
FSB officer exiled in London, was assassinated by radiation poisoning in 2006. The Russian intelligence services, 
and their Soviet predecessors, have a long history of “active measures” that includes disinformation, political 
violence, and repression of civil society. Numerous works detail these activities, including Christopher Andrew’s 
and Vasili Mitrokhin’s The Sword and the Shield. Mitrokhin, the archivist for the KGB (the predecessor of the FSB), 
defected to the West with notes from the KGB’s secret records. 
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widespread dissemination of fake news and extensive corporate and government surveillance 
tailor made for specific targeted segments of the population4. Forming the backdrop to 
Mankind’s drama, the Earth itself appears to be within the throes of its own human-driven 
revolution, with climate change threatening to drastically disrupt the human condition. 
Taken together, the revolutions and traumas in politics, society, technology, and the 
environment, all unfolding simultaneously and synergistically, represent the emergence of an era 
defined by new parameters and terms.  Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker 
described Metamodernism as a “oscillation between a typically modern commitment and a 
markedly postmodern detachment.” They continue that the “threefold threat of the credit crunch, 
a collapsed center, and climate change… infuses doubt, inspires reflection, and incites a move… 
out of the postmodern and into the metamodern” (2010). The simultaneous fragmentation of 
cultural and national identity combined with the collectivizing impulses of globalism produces a 
profound political and economic oscillation that embraces technological-commercial 
advancement while attempting to remain anchored to traditional values. The reinterpretation of 
customary principles to resolve modern social developments signifies the triumph of 
Metamodernism. This uneasy situation produces friction, both material and ideological, inviting 
ideologically promiscuous and apathetic elites to seize the mechanisms of power.  
Even as Mankind collectively experiences unprecedented prosperity, a relatively long 
peace absent of global wars, and significantly longer life expectancies, challenges and crisis still 
cast dark shadows on the human condition.  The principles that govern the interests of the 
 
4 A 2016 New York Times article titled Inside a Fake News Sausage Factory described the economic structure and 
incentive for producing fake news. The subject of the article recognized an appetite for the outrageous headlines that 
he knew to be false, and so he continued to publish them, earning as much as $6,000 a month. In contrast, the U.S. 
intelligence community and the U.S. Congress identified the Internet Research Agency as a body directed by the 
Government of Russia to “reach significant numbers of Americans for purposes of interfering with the U.S. political 
system…” (2018).  
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inherently anti-democratic elite class do not fit easily with egalitarian practices and norms. The 
monopolization of the means of production, the hoarding of capital, and the expansion of police 
and intelligence powers – all part of the on-going metamodern revolution – undermine the 
principles at the heart of democratic governance. Necessarily, elitism requires policies and values 
that construct systems of exclusion. This includes, among other things, the implementation of 
stringent copyright laws, the use of complex highly lawyered legislation, and the extensive use of 
accounting and shadow banking schemes to evade tax obligations. It also includes the 
employment of lobbying and financing of think tanks and political influencers to shape political 
policy, the classification of information determined to be of national security interest, and the 
reliance on technocratic skills and credentials only awarded by elite organizations. This process 
builds a system of shadow power accessible only to those with the right credentials, the right 
skills, or the right relationships, and fundamentally reflects the continued presence of the old 
prerogative to seize and hold power even in a new era of uncertainity and change. This 
metamodern moment offers the elite class an opportunity to further consolidate power and 
maximize wealth while diminishing the rights of the common people. 
The failure of old ideologies has opened an opportunity for the reinterpretation of 
traditional values and the assertion of power by demagogues and populists who appeal to social 
and national grievances. Challenges to the assumptions of capitalism and socialism, of globalism 
and nationalism, of cosmopolitanism and isolationism, have not produced promising solutions to 
modern problems, but have instead heightened international and domestic discord. These 
circumstances have in turn enabled the emergence of partisan firebrands who have embraced 
specific grievances to advance authoritarian political agendas. This anti-democratic authoritarian 
class simultaneously rejects modernity while seizing upon its technological capabilities to 
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promote a mythological ideology grounded in sectarian identity. In this way, this class has 
recycled historical prerogatives of power for the 21st Century. 
This research required an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the views and 
behaviors of the metamodern elite, and asked, using the examples of the United States and 
Russia, what the metamodern future might look like. 
Research Question 
The research question investigated, through documentary content analysis, the influences 
of Metamodernism upon the speeches and policies of U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. The research question was:- 
In what ways do the speeches of the Trump administration of the United States and the Putin 
administration of Russia reflect Metamodernism (e.g. can either president be defined as 
‘metamodern’)? 
Chapter Conclusion 
The next four chapters detail the course and findings of the examination in response to 
the research question. Chapter 2, the literature review, discusses the emergence of a Metamodern 
world by tracing its history from modern through the post-modern and finally to the present. It 
also discusses other significant theoretical frameworks for understanding nationalism, the state, 
and elite theory. Chapter 3 explains the research method selected for this research: comparative 
content analysis. This approach provides the tools necessary to properly frame the language used 
by Presidents Trump and Putin to place them within the Metamodern context. Chapter 4 
highlights the findings and results of the study, providing a coded framework for the language 
used by the subjects of the case study. Lastly, Chapter 5 suggests further research, including the 
development of a potential typology for Metamodern presidents. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Towards a Metamodern World 
As described in the previous chapter, Metamodernism represents a collision between old 
and new, conservative and progressive, with a contradictory desire and rejection of both. It does 
not cut neatly across political or ideological boundaries, but instead contends with old problems 
under new conditions, often aggravated by crisis. At its core, it suggests an inherent human 
longing for stability (represented in large part by the embrace of ‘traditional’ values) while also 
recognizing humanity’s own acknowledgement, even if subconsciously, that an ideal historical 
past probably never existed in the first place. 
Signals of the Metamodern Era 
Among the “ten basic principles of Metamodernism” identified by professor Seth 
Abramson, “the collapse of distances” and “multiple subjectivities” fit prominently. According 
to Abramson, the “simultaneous anonymity and false intimacy of the Internet… makes it harder 
to… distinguish what we could or do believe from what others believe.” This causes a “swirl of 
identity and belief we only sometimes… control.” The collapse of distances facilities multiple 
subjectivities because “we often find ourselves joining our words and actions with people we 
know nothing about – except that they agree with us as to the issue we’re discussing in the 
moment.” This allows people to “switch subjective positions as feels emotionally and/or 
logistically appropriate, tune out subjectivities temporarily… or create entirely new subjectivities 
that have more meaning…” (2015). A cynical elite, focused on the singular aim of consolidating 
power and equipped with the instruments of state and technology, can exploit this feature of 
Metamodernism for its own ends. This elite can substitute traditional “ideological anchorage” 
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with its own narratives and subjectivities, and, because of the collapse of distances, tailor it for 
specific targeted demographics and deliver it in real-time.  
In a separate article, Abramson added five more principles of Metamodernism, including 
“reconstruction instead of deconstruction” and “walllessness and borderlessness”. As will be 
seen later, this process also contrasts with the exclusionary nature of nationalism and elitism. 
Metamodernism permits a reconstruction into a “unified whole that can’t easily be deconstructed 
into its parts” (2015). Navigating the intimate spaces of collapsed distances between multiple 
subjectivities requires constant engagement between apparently contradictory compulsions. This 
necessarily abolishes walls and borders, sometimes at great cost,  and appropriating them for new 
purposes not imagined by the original creators. Within this context, organized political power 
can mobilize the creation (and reconstruction) of narratives. Political elites and state actors 
employing social media tools and a complex, opaque web of patronage and financial networks 
can develop and deploy targeted narratives to individual households and communication devices.  
Recognizing the intensifying contradictions of emerging trends, Luke Turner’s 
Metamodernist Manifesto recommended a “pragmatic romanticism unhindered by ideological 
anchorage” (2011). This yearning has manifested itself in Donald Trump’s presidential campaign 
slogan “Make America Great Again” and Vladimir Putin’s frequent ruminations about the 
consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both men have capitalized on the anxiety 
produced by the friction created between the collision of modern economics and politics with 
traditional values. Both Presidents have also demonstrated a remarkably distant relationship with 
ideological principles that speak to a belief in a more fundamental truth. In this sense, 
metamodern leaders pursuing a “pragmatic romanticism” simultaneously use articulable methods 
while pursuing nostalgic ideals that may never have existed in reality. Unsurprisingly, the 
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detachment from “ideological anchorage” corresponds with the emergence of fake news, massive 
state-directed disinformation campaigns, climate change denial, and the populist rejection of 
expertise. Paradoxically, their efforts to rebuild walls (in some cases, physically) around 
arbitrarily drawn boundaries of identity reflect an apparent Metamodern impulse to 
simultaneously collapse distances between homogeneous contingents while creating space from 
an unrecognizable Other. Both Trump and Putin selectively re-draw boundaries to form 
coalitions supportive of their agenda, with Trump specifically attempting to create synergistic 
allegiences across diverse, even contradictory identities, centered on his person. In this way, 
walls and becomes become instruments and symbols themselves, rather than immutable features 
of social terrain. Even as this process compels intimacy among contingent identities both 
individually and collectively, it appears to also stimulate resistance. 
The Origins of Metamodernism 
Metamodernism’s lineage can be traced back to modernism, which challenged the 
traditional hierarchies and power structures of the late 19th and 20th centuries, including 
religion, morality, and the state. 
Modernism: from Skepsis to Dogma. Skepticism  and nihilism initially defined 
modernism. German philosopher Fredrich Nietzsche set forth the epistemological principles that 
would ultimately come to characterize modernism, which could fundamentally be summarized 
by his statement that “there are no facts, only interpretations” (1977). This simple statement 
challenged  both the conservative and liberal philosophical principles of the time; the first 
asserting that values originated from God (or some other higher power), and the second that 
values were inherent in mankind. Nietzsche’s oft misunderstood claim that “God is dead” (1887) 
referred to his belief that God, as a source of moral validation and values, no longer existed. 
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Further, his commentary that “we do not believe in a right that does not proceed from a power 
which is able to uphold it… we regard all rights as conquests” (2016) also challenged liberal 
values holding the inherency of individual worth.  
Nietzsche did not just confront theological doctrine, but also questioned the ability for 
people to know anything at all, asking “what does man actually know about himself?” (1873). 
This line of inquiry began the separation between the material and the symbols that represent 
them, as he further asked, “Are designations congruent with things? Is language the adequate 
expression of all realities?” (1873). He recognized the importance of the separation, stating that, 
“We obtain the concept… by overlooking what is individual and actual…” (1873). This initial 
perception of divergence between the material and the epistemological would have long-term 
consequences. People, he claimed, had no inherent  concern about “pure knowledge”, but instead 
were “hostilely inclined” against “those truths which are possibly harmful and destructive…” 
(1873). This perception made truth’s value contingent on perspective, decoupling it from a 
central authority such as God or the state. 
For the purposes of this examination, Nietzsche also expressed cynicism about the state, 
asserting that the state is “the coldest of all cold monsters” (2008). He further declared that “the 
state lieth in all languages… whatever it saith it lieth… whatever it hath it hath stolen” (2008). 
This challenge to the state’s legitimacy as a central component of human activity and values 
would manifest itself later in postmodernism and Metamodernism.  
Another prominent philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, continued with the criticism about the 
origin of morality claiming that “everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist… he 
cannot find anything to depend upon either within or outside himself…” (1989). He further 
asserted that “justice is a human issue, and I do not need a god to teach it to me” (1943). But 
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Sartre also departed from Nietzsche’s apparent nihilism, claiming that “we will freedom for 
freedom’s sake… I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim” 
(1946). 
The disposal of institutional sanctities such as God and the state permeated through the 
thoughts of other thinkers. Gilles Deleuze stated that “there is no need to fear or hope, but only to 
look for new weapons” (1990). Paul Valery warned that “If the state is strong, it crushes us. If it 
is weak, we perish.” (1971). Gyorgy Luckacs recognized that “history is precisely the history 
of… institutions…” which “start by controlling economic relationships between men and on to 
permeate all human relations…” (1968).  
The words of Max Horkheimer perhaps best summarize the position of modernists. He 
stated that “the concept of God was for a long time the place where the idea was kept alive that 
there are other norms besides those to which nature and society give expression…” (1995), 
recognizing God not as a source of morality, but instead as a symbol of it. But this also meant 
that people had to surrender the laws of men, stating “whoever desires to live among men has to 
obey their laws, the basis for “secular morality” in the West, and consequently “rationality… of 
such obedience swallows up everything, even the freedom to think” (1941). Thus, even  the state 
becomes separated from material reality, as it enforces the laws of men. This results in a 
structure in which a man’s worth “must be certified by special social circumstances stipulated in 
documents” (1937) and where “there is no theoretical obstacle” to the idea that dictatorship is 
good is “rationally valid” for its beneficiaries (2013). In summary, neither God or state provide 
legitimacy, nor does it derive internally, but it instead emerges from human action. 
The thinkers above, from Nietzsche to Horkheimer, deconstructed the traditional 
institutions of God and state, and replaced them with larger narratives about human behavior and 
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a general skepticism. Modernism’s initial deconstructionism would combine with doubts about 
its universality to fuel postmodernism. 
The Alternative Illusions of Postmodernism. Metamodernism emerged as a response to 
postmodernism, itself a rejection of modernism. Deconstructionist at its core, post-modernism 
challenged the universalist narratives of a modern world built on the Enlightenment (and 
Western) ideals of scientific process, rational decision-making, and objectivity. Instead, 
postmodernism situated these claims within socially, economically, and politically contingent 
parameters that often proved internally contradictory.  Predictably, postmodernism emerged and 
gained strength in the aftermath of the titanic ideological struggle of the Second World War and 
during the collapse of centuries-old European colonial empires built on world-spanning 
mythologies of Western superiority. The internal contradictions of Enlightenment ideology 
reached their apex with democratic capitalism, fascism, and communism, all theoretically 
grounded in ideas of rationality, science, and absolute truths that prounced universal application. 
Thus, postmodernism created the epistemological breach through which charged 
Metamodernism. 
Martin Heidegger predicted the clash of subjectivities that fit so prominently in the 
metamodern construct. In The Question Concerning Technology, he claimed that “the 
fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture”, a situation where 
“the structured image” man produces for the “calculating, planning, and molding of all things” is 
cultivated for a “struggle of world views” (1954).  Michael Foucault continued this extrapolation 
in the History of Sexuality, where he describes “a conception of power which replaces the 
privilege of the law with the viewpoint of the objective, the privilege of prohibition with the 
viewpoint of tactical efficacy, the privilege of sovereignty with the analysis of a multiple and 
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mobile field of force relations wherein… effects of domination are produced” (1976). In other 
words, the frames and constructs themselves become tools in a struggle for power. Jean-Francois 
Lyotard underlies this fracturing of the old global order in The Postmodern Condition by 
describing a “crisis of scientific knowledge” that “represents… an internal erosion of the 
legitimacy principle of knowledge” and that, as a result, “disciplines disappear, overlappings 
occur… between sciences, and from these new territories are born,” which ultimately “gives way 
to an immanent… network of areas of inquiry, the respective frontiers of which are in  constant 
flux” (1979). Heidegger, Foucault, and Lyotard all describe a process in which fixed narratives 
collapse and give way to unanchored, tactically useful, and targeted subjectivities; in a sense, a 
diffusion of centralized power.  
Carving away the epistemological foundations of modernity, post-modernism embraced 
pluralism and subjectivity as an alternate structure of placing frames and references. In The 
Writing and Difference, Jacques Derrida stated that “in the absence of a center or origin, 
everything becomes discourse” and that “the absence of a transcendental signified extends the 
domain and the play of signification infinitely” (1966). Without a defined center tethering the 
structure, the structure itself becomes boundless, and therefore bounds together all of the 
contradictory impulses and behavior. Derrida continues by stating that “it is a question of 
explicitly and systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from 
a heritage the resources necessary for [its] deconstruction… a problem of economy and strategy” 
(1966). Navigating this philosophical wilderness does not rely upon rational arguments 
competing in a marketplace of ideas, itself an Enlightenment paradigm, but instead upon 
maneuvering within the recognized parameters of the structure and breaking them. 
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Jean Baudrillard also reflected on this phenomenon in Simulacra and Simulation, positing 
that the distance of symbols from their original meaning masked an underlying truth, and no 
longer reflected reality to any meaningful extent. This distance created a situation in which “the 
real is no longer what it used to be,” inviting a “proliferation of myths of origin and signs of 
reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity, and authenticity” (1983).   
Postmodernism impacted the West broadly, and the United States specifically. As the 
preeminent superpower, America’s cultural and social product throughout the Cold War shaped 
the developments contained within the broader system of globalization. The international system 
adopted America’s principles and customs, and therefore the country came to define the global 
center against which all other forms were measured. Thus, the impact of postmodernism, and 
subsequently Metamodernism, on the United States had international consequences. Donald 
Wood argued in the Unraveling of the West: Postmodernism and the Decline of Democracy that 
the extremist skepticism, criticism, and subjectivities of postmodernism has undermined the 
foundations of Western democracy. Abandoning the principles of the Enlightenment, chief 
among them reason, Western society has surrendered to tribalism and demagoguery (2003). 
Theda Skocpol, in The States and Social Revolutions, argued that “the state is… fundamentally 
Janus-faced, with an intrinsically dual anchorage in class-divided socioeconomic structures and 
an international system of states” where “state executives… will be found maneuvering to 
extract resources and build administrative and coercive organizations” (1979). In this sense, post-
modernism both recognized and accelerated the erosion of Western values by breaking the grand 
narratives that bound together liberal societies and rendering unto each their own subjectivity. 
Within this complex process, atomized actors, particularly elites, seek out their self interest. 
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Russia: Simulations of State and Identity 
Given the postmodern fixation on simulation and representation, Russia may be said to be 
a post-modern polity in practice.  It has long oscillated between Europe and Asia, autocracy and 
democracy, and spiritualism and materialism. In this experience, it has formulated constructions 
of its own, creating reproductions of Western creations. Anatoly Chernyaev, writing in 
Continuity and Succession in Contemporary Russian Philosophy, argued that postmodernism, in 
the Western sense, found a “fertile soil in Russia” because the country’s “intellectual elites have 
always… [heeded] the latest word of Western wisdom” and that “Russian thought has always 
been closely associated with aesthetics.” Russian philosophy, “in constant dialogue with relevant 
orientations of Western thought”, developed a “national style of its own” (2014). 
But more fundamentally, this national style, described by Evgeny Dobrenko in Utopias of 
Return, remained firmly “in the realm of representation, utterly distracted by [Russia’s] own 
thwarted identity complex.” In yearning to join the European community, Russia simulated 
universalized ideas and mechanics, but never actually embraced them; “split between the reality 
of its own powerlessness and poverty, and the myth of its greatness.” Dobrenko continued by 
claiming that “one might say that the tradition of simulating ‘civilization’ is the defining factor 
of Russian history…” (2011). Russia did not embrace postmodernism as much as simulated it, as 
it did with socialism and democracy. 
Mikhail Ephstein, in After the Future: the Paradoxes of Postmodernism and 
Contemporary Russian Culture (1995), described Russia’s machinations further. He posited that, 
in part, Russia experienced a form of postmodernism predating its actual development in the 
West: “the production of reality… has been routinely accomplished throughout all of Russian 
history” (p. 191). The various institutions of Russian society did not develop organically, but 
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instead the state “implanted [them] from above in the form of smoothly whittled twigs in the 
hopes they might take root…”, creating a “civilization composed entirely of names” (pp. 191 – 
192). Unsurprisingly then, Russia gave birth to the term “Potemkin village”, a polished 
presentation divorced from reality. The Marquis de Custine, after visiting Russia in 1839, 
famously described the country in Letters from Russia as a “country of fictions”, “an empire of 
catalogues”, and a place where “words matter more than reality” (2014).  
The collapse of the Soviet Union, perhaps a master simulation experiment in its own 
right, having mashed together disparate classes and nationalities in an autocratic system 
presenting itself as liberating and democratic, had a significant impact on Russian culture and 
identity. Russia’s territorial expansionism, an internal form of settler-colonization, had a similar 
impact on the country’s identity and discourse. Mass population expulsions, transfers, and 
repressions during the 20th century under Joseph Stalin represented the height of this form of 
colonialism, only for the Soviet system to collapse sixty years later, leaving a traumatic legacy 
that Russian culture has had difficulty addressing. It has also led to numerous conflicts between 
Russia and its former subjects, including Georgia and Ukraine. Vitaly Chernetsky, in Mapping 
Postcommunist Cultures, called the Russian center the “metropoly”, and it’s the fragmentation of 
this Russian imperial polity that has so thoroughly shaken Russian society (2007).  
Here returns Dobrenko, who argued that Russia’s history consists of overcoming trauma 
with façade, with postmodernism as a process to overcome the Stalinist trauma that echoes into 
the present day (2011). He stated that “this time around, the country is entering the ‘European 
house’ by simulating a ‘market economy’, ‘democracy’, and ‘postmodernism’” but that Russia 
has not fundamentally changed. Thus, Russia’s self-image becomes one in which “how you wish 
to be seen is how you wish to be in reality”, constituting “the last and strongest thread connecting 
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today’s Russia with its history;” one that “can be reduced to a chain of leaps forward in an 
endless process…” (2011). In this context, Russia, insecure and malleable, beset by trauma, 
becomes vulnerable to Metamodernism’s promise of the reconstruction of identities in a space 
between spaces. 
Both the United States and Russia entered the 21st Century uncertain about their 
respective destinies and their own national identities. Faced by trauma, potential disintegration, 
and social unrest, each witnessed the deconstruction of their greatest symbols by terrorism, 
economic crisis, and or political disintegration.  
United in Delusion: State, Nation, and Nationalism 
The state has emerged as the basic unit in the global political order. Various theories 
provide critical analysis about the function and legitimacy of the state, and the ways in which it 
influences, or is influenced by, other factors such as economics, social and cultural values, and 
individual and bureaucratic preferences. Within the context of Metamodernism, these theories 
help explain the context and contours of unfolding crises.  
The Foundations of the State 
Although multiple theories exist explaining state formation and functions, two of them, 
pluralism and Marxism, provide the most relevant descriptions for the purposes of this 
examination. Whereas pluralists articulate a vision of politics and state power contingent on 
transitory issues, interests, and groups, Marxism advances a theory based upon structures of 
power determined by the collision of classes in material-economic processes. A quick review of 
political theories of the state places Metamodernism in a contemporary context. 
Pluralism: The State as Contract. Pluralism principally characterizes the state as a form 
of social contract; a political unit formed for the purposes of collective action and the resolution 
  17 
 
of conflict between individuals or communities. In The Prince, Niccolo Machiavelli articulated a 
vision of state practice resembling a contract: “well-ordered states and wise princes have taken 
every care to… keep the people satisfied and contended, for this is one of the most important 
objects a prince can have.” He further described “good laws” as one of the “chief foundations” of 
states (1513). Famously, John Locke, writing in the Second Treatise of Government, articulated 
a similar conception of statehood, asserting that “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions (1689). These individuals, among others, initiated the pluralist tradition 
framing the state as the result of mutual agreement among society’s members who share 
obligations toward one another. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau provided a more formulaic description, explicitly describing a 
“society contract” through which “man… gains… civil liberty.” He continued by asserting that 
“it is solely on the basis of… common interest that every should be governed.” He warned that 
“it is therefore essential… that there should be no partial society within the State… but if there 
are partial societies, it is best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being 
unequal” (1762).  These ideas advocated a form of participatory democracy in which the state’s 
stakeholders could not impose tyranny or injustice on each other.  
Locke and Rousseau responded to an idea of a so-called ‘state of nature’, where the 
strong dominated the weak, and the ‘laws’ of nature as such governed the relationship between 
people before the emergence of the state. In the Leviathan (1651), British philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes described the state of nature as a “war of every one against every one” where “every 
man has a right to every thing, even to another’s body.” To extract oneself from this situation, 
Hobbes argued, individuals form a state (a “commonwealth”), as “covenant” to protect their 
collective good. Hobbes does not argue for a republic, but instead a monarchial government to 
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which the majority consents to follow. Nevertheless, a social contract underlies this form of 
government with mutual obligations between the ruler and the ruled.  
The realization of democratic governance, however imperfect, in the United States 
spurred additional ideas about building a pluralistic society. James Madison, writing in the 
Federalist Papers in defense of the new country’s constitution, asserted that “the people are the 
only legitimate foundation of power… and it is from them that the constitutional charter… is 
derived.” He also proclaimed that “justice is the end of government” (1788). The concern with 
justice as a purpose for the state became more prominent with the French Revolution, with 
Edmund Burke affirming that “justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society.” He 
insisted that “society is, indeed, a contract… a partnership not only between those who are 
living, but between those who are to be born” (1790). 
Contemporary political theorists formalized the ideas expressed by earlier writers and 
practitioners into an organized theory of pluralism. A selection of theorists relevant to this 
paper’s discussion illustrate pluralism’s focus on civil society and the state as contracts in which 
near-equal individuals and groups resolve their differences through agreed upon mechanicisms.  
Nelson Polsby offered that “pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues 
can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions… ranging in their duration from momentary to 
semi-permanent.” He further described civil society as constituted of “hundreds of small ‘special 
interest’ groups, with incompletely overlappying memeberships, widely differing power bases, 
and a multitude of techniques for exercising influence on decisions…” (1960). Similarly, Elmer 
Eric Schattschneider described political parties in a democratic society as “merely an 
arrangement in which a large number of people co-operate for the accomplishment of certain 
common purposes” (1952). This position presupposes the existence of an underlying social 
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contract regulating the ways in which people relate to one another politically, and defining the 
acceptable methods that may be employed in pursuing political aims. Nevertheless, Polsby also 
recognized the tension likely to arise in a diverse, democratic society, emphasizing the 
importance of compromise (1985). 
William Connolly continued developing this idea by ascribing structure to pluralism and 
recogning the subjectivities pressuring contemporary civic society. As early as 1994, he stated 
that “Pluralism… remains inattentative to… how every identity is indebted to intrasubjective and 
intersubjective differences through which it becomes… regulated… and it treats the overcoded 
border of the territorial state as the final boundary…” (pp. 12 -15). Recognizing the diversity of 
beliefs and identities in the current era, he advocated the “[construction of] a militant pluralist 
assemblage… of constituencies in multiple subject positions” that “will not all come from the 
same class or… creeds”, but “come together out of growing concern for the fragility of things.” 
He continued with his belief that “a multifaceted social movement… will come from energetic, 
creative, younger contingents…” (2015). Concerned with the construction of a unified 
movement in an increasingly de-centered and fractured political environment, he stated that, 
“deep pluralism… is an urgently needed alternative…” and with it the “demanding task… to 
embed an ethos of engagement in churches, families, schools, consumptions practices, media 
dramas, education, and state priorities” (2011). For this reason, Connolly supported a 
“democracy infused with a spirit of agonism” that contains “spaces for difference… established 
through… political contestation” (2001). Connolly envisioned a pluralistic society of different 
identity social contingents, a recognition of the problems of the metamodern era. 
Marxism: The State as Instrument. In contrast to the pluralist vision of the state as a 
contract between competing but relatively equal individuals and groups within society, Marxism 
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recognized the state as an instrument reflecting the structure of power within a given society. For 
Marxist theorists, the state, specifically in capitalist countries, emerged as the vanguard of the 
bourgeous elite in protecting private property. 
Karl Marx argued that the “emancipation of private property from the community” led to 
the “state [becoming] a separate entity, beside and ouside of civil society… nothing more than 
the form of organization… for the mutual guarantee of… property and interests” of the 
bourgeois. The emergence of the propertied class “[correspondend with] the modern state, 
which, purchased gradually by the owners of property… has fallen entirely into their hands… 
and its existence has become wholly dependent” on the bourgeois’ largess (1846). The shape and 
functions of the state arose from the organization of labor and capital in a historical materialist 
process. As a result, according to Marx, the “executive of the modern state is nothing but a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoise” (1848).  
Vladimir Lenin developed this theory further, asserting that the “state is a product and 
manifestation of the irreconcilability of class contradictions.” Consequently, “the state arises 
where… class contradictions objectively cannot be reconciled” (1917). In other words, the 
functions and behavior of the state represent the interests and domination of one class over all 
others. The era of capitalism specifically “witnessed an unprecedented strengthening of the ‘state 
machine” and an unprecendented growth of its bureaucratic and military apparatus, in connection 
with the increase in repressive measures against the proletariat…” (1917).   
The processes driving the dominance of the capitalist state culminated 
contemporaneously in a globalized world with the state subordinated to capital, and the removal 
of restrictions placed on the movement of capital and its owners.  Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri labelled this world order “Empire”, in which “the center that supports globalization of 
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productive networks… [envelops] all power relations… and… deploys a powerful police 
function against the new barbarians…” They described “Empire” as an “apparatus of capture… a 
vampire regime of accumulated labor that survives only by sucking off the blood of the living” 
(2000). This process also created a “labor that produces immaterial products, such as 
information, knowledge, ideas, images, relationships…” whose “qualities and characteristics… 
[tend] to transform the other forms of labor and… society as a whole”, creating “innumerable 
and indeterminate relationships of distributed networks” (2004). The emergent world-regime 
reflects the domination of the capital class, with the role of the state subordinated to the material 
compulsion for the expansion of capital’s reach. 
The state therefore remains one of the primary units of political action, and its 
mobilization during a time of crisis, such as those that define the metamodern era, has a direct 
bearing on the analysis of the American and Russian presidents. 
The Mask of the Nation 
Although both pluralist and Marxist theory suggest the evolution of a global 
superstructure, the persistence of nationalism, tied to political, ethnic, cultural, and religious 
identities (and intensified by the technological process of globalization), provides a layer of 
contingent subjectivity that produces inevitable conflict. Two important features of nationalism 
become important within the context of Metamodernism: first, that it simultaneously aligns and 
competes with the state as a political entity, and second, that it increases during times of crisis, 
which defines the metamodern period. 
Ernest Gellner stated that nationalism “holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent” in a system in which “atomized individuals [are] held together above all by 
a shared culture…” (2009). This culture can be defined by ethnic, religious, or political beliefs 
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and practices. In contrast, John Breuilly argued that elites mobilize nationalist sentinment in 
opposition to the state (1994). However, the pragmatic romanticism and multiple subjectivities 
described by Metamodernism reconciles these two opposing views of nationalism. National 
identity becomes a weapon in conflict and can be used to strengthen the state and to destroy it. 
Given the central role of the state, its combination with nationalism provides another framework 
for understsanding how societies and their leaders might respond to crisis. 
Importantly for the purposes of this examination, nationalism increases in time of crisis. 
As noted by Jeffery Herbst, “people realize… that they are under threat because of who they are 
as a nation…” forcing a recognition “that it is only as a nation that can successfully defeat the 
threat” (2003). The various crises of the metamodern era – economic, cultural, environmental, 
and so on – pull upon nationalist identity as they threaten to undermine the perceived priveleges 
and status of nationalist units.  
In this way, nationalism potentially becomes one vehicle of many around which people 
and elites can form identities and mobilize action.  
The Elites of the Metamodern World 
The three themes highlighted above – a world in crisis, the state as both contract and 
instrument for political action, and the intimacy of both conflict and the state with nationalist 
sentinment – provide context for understanding elite behavior.  
America: An Iron Brotherhood. Elite theory has a long tradition in political science, 
dating back to C. Wright Mill’s seminal work on the subject regarding America’s political, 
economic, and social elite. In The Power Elite, he defined the contours of elite theory, stating 
that “the power elite is composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary 
environments…” since “they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences,” 
  23 
 
owing to their “command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society… the big 
corporations… the machinery of the state… [and] the military establishment.” Within the United 
States specifically, “major national power… resides in the economic, the political, and the 
military domains…” where “the means of power at the disposal of decision makers have 
increased enormously” (1956). In this approach, the elite derive their power from the positions 
they occupy, creating an instrumentalist elite dependent on the capabilities of the vast 
bureaucracies and administrations – economic, political, and military - under their authority.  
G. William Domhoff offered a similar approach, arguing that the power elite dominate 
U.S. politics in a “corporate-conservative coalition” aided by “a wide variety of patriotic… and 
other single-issue organizations” that receive funding from “the corporate rich… and middle-
class conservatives”, allowing them to control the federal government through “interest-group 
and policy formulation processes” and “appointments to major government positions” (1967). 
Again, the elite derive their power from the positions they occupy in interlocking and reinforcing 
economic and political circles. 
This view of elite theory has particular consequences for democratic governance; namely, 
the formulation of policies and resolution of internal conflicts. Dye argues that public policy is 
made from the top down, with the national elite defining the policies and policy-making process 
(2001). Similarly, Schattschneider described democracy as “competitive political system in 
which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way 
that the public can participate in the decision-making process” (1975). Both arguments propose a 
friction between elitism and pluralism, with most conflicts resolved in favor of the elite due to a 
combination of their resources, relationships, wealth, and organization. The elite themselves do 
not represent a monolithic whole, as argued by Robert Lerner and Althea Nagai, suggesting that 
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“strategic elites” better reflect a ruling class sometimes sharply divided on economic and social 
issues (1996). Neither do the elite simply occupy positions of governmental authority; Schwartz, 
in introducing The Structure of Power in America, speaks of the “business elite as a ruling class” 
because it “controls the places where many key public policies are decided: the boardrooms and 
executive suites of the major financial industrial corporations of America” (1987). 
These interlocking relationships do not only appear in abstract class relationships, but 
also in very personal and individual instances. Individuals frequently move between government 
and the industries and corporations regulated by government action. This process of the 
“revolving door” not only produces “conflicts of interest and the possibility of corruption”, but 
also may increase “favoritism, abuse of power, discriminatory treatment, lack of impartiality…” 
and can “[give] certain individuals privileged access to policymaking…” (Cerrillo-i-Martinez, 
2017). This can potentially erode trust in democratic institutions and increase class antagonisms.  
Unsurprisingly, recognizing elite power in and out of government, several factors define elite 
dominance since the 1970s, including an increase in the “power and influence of multinational 
corporations,” the “emergence of doctrines of the ‘New Right’,” and the “[assertion of] an 
extreme individualism” that “accepted… a gross commercialization of social life and the growth 
of inequality” (Bottomore, 1993). 
In this evolution of elite power, at the confluence of an American identity crisis, 
international stagnation, and post-economic collapse, arrives an American businessman with 
outsized promises about restoring America’s power. F. H. Buckley argues in Conservatism: 
Trump and Beyond that four themes elected Trump to the American presidency in 2016: 
mobility, jobs, religion, and nationalism; subjects the Republican establishment ignored (2018). 
Trump combined this appeal with, according to Edward Appel, “stridently divisive rhetorical 
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tactics” that evidence a powerful and “wrenching… break from settled presidential campaign 
norms” and it “underscores an intensity of rhetorical frame-shattering at minimum” with “near-
explicable ‘normalization’ of Trump’s vitriol, fabrication, and threatened mayhem” after the 
election (2018). Trump himself, Christian Fuchs argues, represents “possessive hyper-
individualism” and an authoritarian leadership principle that presents itself as “populist, 
aggressive, attack-oriented, offensive…” which makes Trump’s brand of “spectacle, showman” 
unpredictable when formulating government policy (2017).  The features that define Trump’s 
“rhetorical signature” include “spontaneous and unpredictable”, “evidence flouting”, 
“accountability dodging”, and “institution disdaining” (Jamieson & Taussig, 2017). Connolly 
adds that Trump’s speaking method “is not designed… to articulate a policy agenda” but to 
appeal to “dispersed anxieties and resentments about race, border issues, immigration…” (2017). 
Consequently, as part of the political climate during the Trump era, “racial and ethnic differences 
are now… more potent drivers of political division than any other demographic characteristics,” 
with Trump heightening partisanship because of “his welcoming of white nationalists and 
hardline anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant voices into his coalition…” (Jacobson, 2017). Now 
President, Trump manages an unstable political “hybrid” between “populist devices to mobilize 
support, and an organized political coalition within his party with radically different priorities” 
(Pierson, 2017) while tormented by incensed and mobilized challengers to his agenda. 
Trump therefore represents both the culmination of elite domination: a billionaire 
braggadocio without any notable meritocratic achievements suggesting competency at 
governance but that commands a devoutly loyal following that obeys him as he upends decades 
of elite consensus on topics as wide-ranging as international security and immigration. His words 
  26 
 
and actions have invited back into the American sphere ideologies as diverse as isolationism and 
overt racism. Trump has arrived at America’s metamodern moment. 
Russia: A Special Kind of Brotherhood. Like the United States, Russia too faces a 
unique metamodern time. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the successor state, the Russian 
Federation, has undergone a tumultuous transformation from a socialist superpower to an 
authoritarian state-centered market economy. Even with the changes of names and faces, the 
country’s internal organization and power dynamics remains remarkably similar to its 
predecessor.  
In the decade following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a wild 
transformation as a result of both Boris Yeltsin’s management style and disagreements among 
the political elites that Yeltsin could not resolve.  In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet 
collapse, sharp disagreements between Westernizers and centrists forced the centrists to ally with 
nationalists and communists, setting the foundations for Russia’s post-Soviet elite political 
conflict (Kullberg, 1994).  Anne Clunan explained in The Social Construction of Russia’s 
Resurgence that the country’s elite “shared an aspiration to retain the historical great power 
status” but “never settled… on a key element of national identity, the question of Russia’s 
political purpose” (2009, p. 104). This created a “marked ambivalence” about Russia’s identity 
in relation to the West with a focus on status maintenance as a great power (p. 105).  
Additionally, the transformation from socialism to a market economy led to the rise to power of 
oligarchs that controlled substantial parts of the economy, and with it, the concentration of 
wealth and the creation of extreme income inequality (Fidrmuc & Gundacker, 2017). The social 
and economic instability provided the opening for an assertive elite to claim the mantle of 
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leadership. Understanding the role of crisis in ushering in the meta-modern era, this experience 
also prepared the Russian polity for its arrival.  
Vladimir Putin emerged as a champion that promised both stability and purpose. Allied 
with the power ministries and a close circle of compatriots from St. Petersburg, he embarked 
upon a campaign to subdue opposition to his presidency. In The Putin Principle, Karen Dawisha 
described a “kleptocratic tribute system underlying Russia’s authoritarian regime” where “the 
state nationalizes the risk but privatizes the rewards to those closest to the president in return for 
their loyalty” (2015).  Putin maintains control of Russia through “coercion and intimidation”, 
murdering journalists, activities, and political opponents (Knight, 2017). Through these methods, 
he has managed to create a new, assertive Russian authoritarianism (Myers, 2016). Russia’s 
“total interpenetration of business and politics” generates “informality, opacity, favouritism, and 
corruption,” creating a system of “mainly oligarchic and autocratic components” expressed as 
“bureaucratic, plebiscitarian, and glamorous authoritarianism” (Mommsen, 2012).  
Through the consolidation of the so-called ‘power vertical’, Putin has subordinated sub-
national elites to his administration. The organization of the ‘power vertical’, instituted by Putin, 
“[embraced] state centralization as its major component” while also creating incentives for 
“subnational elite cooptation… inherent in electoral authoritarian regimes” (Golosov & 
Konstantinova, 2016). In Regional Elites in Contemporary Russia, Alla Chirikova explained that 
the construction of the power vertical “[turned] the relationship between center and regions… to 
one of hierarchical co-subordination.” In this structure, the “economic infusions from the center 
are now (more) important… than the preservation of… political resources,” making regional 
development “increasingly dependent on orders from the Kremlin” (2010). Chirikova further 
discussed the power vertical in The Power Vertical in the Assessments of Regional Elites, where 
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she asserts that “as the power vertical is consolidated, the [regional] governors are increasingly 
becoming coordinators” (2010). In Regional Elites in Post-Soviet Russia, Badovskii and Shutov 
described the “political and ideological orientation” of Russia’s regional elites as “relatively 
vague”, and that ideological terms such as ‘communist’ and ‘democrat’ describe elite “affiliation 
with a group that supports a specific person” instead of a “person’s politico-ideological views” 
(1997). In Russia, a “self-imposed consensus” exists as “a major tool for integration” of the 
country’s national elites, reinforced by the Kremlin’s “attempts to restrain the political 
autonomy” of independent actors, resulting in a “subordinate status” for the oligarchs (Gel’man, 
2002). Nevertheless, wealthy regions have more bargaining power with the Russian ‘center’ than 
do less wealthy regions (Panov & Ross, 2016). 
Consequently, Putin has created a system with few internal ideological deviations, and 
almost no difference in organization than its Soviet predecessor. Michael Burda, in Political Elite 
of Modern Russia, described a process of elite formation that involves the selection of political 
candidates by a narrow circle of senior government officials (2017).   All of Russia’s elite 
factions have a “statist or state-centered orientation” (Levada, 2010). Additionally, acccording to 
Vladimir Gel’man in Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy, “all political 
parties [have become] effectively controlled by the Kremlin” and the “major opposition parties 
[became] extinct” (2008). Alina Dikikh, in The Party of Power in Russia, compared the functions 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a “severely gegemonist party” and United Russia 
as a “moderately dominant party,” concluding that the parties differ “not only in signs, but also 
the type of political system,” where United Russia’s identity is not “full identification with the 
state” (2014).  Russia’s predominant party, United Russia, “functions as an ‘electoral 
machine’… [performing] the functions of elite mobilization satisfactorily… because of the 
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incontestable authority of the ‘Center’…” creating a party “from the top down” to “implement 
instructions from above… not for displaying initiative” or “working out a state policy course” 
(Makarenko, 2012). The major parties of Russia, including United Russia, “[treat] religion and/or 
spirituality as useful primarily in the creation of patriotic citizens” and “[confounded] spirituality 
with culture” (Papkova, 2007). With minor differences, the regional elites of post-Soviet Russia 
reflect the elites that governed Russia during the Soviet era (Moses, 2008). Subsequently, the 
“political elites… remain the principal barrier to Russia’s democratic development” because they 
have “constructed a political system which effectively closed off entry to the mass of the 
populace and to civil society…” (Gill, 2002). 
Whatever Russia’s internal political organization, one continuity remains at the center of 
Russian elite power and behavior. Julie Anderson, in The Chekist Takeover of the Russian State, 
describes a polity thoroughly subordinated to the security services, especially the Federal 
Security Service (FSB). She claimed that the FSB, a successor to the Soviet Union’s Committee 
for State Security (KGB), “has gained control of the country’s political and economic sectors and 
exercises its power with a firm and ruthless hand…” having “effectively thwarted” Russia’s 
transition to democracy (2006). Russian President Vladimir Putin served in the KGB and briefly 
led the FSB before becoming Prime Minister, then President. The FSB, allied with organized 
crime, has “[served] to only further consolidate the endemic corruption that permeates” the 
Russian power structure, making it an “oppressive, authoritarian regime composed mainly of 
career chekists” (2006). Russia’s security services “remain locked in the past…” and the 
“closeness of high-ranking intelligence officials to the Kremlin… makes it difficult for Russian 
leaders to arrive at any independent assessment…” (Soldatov & Borogan, 2011). Captured by the 
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security services, the Russian state subordinates national identity and political purpose to the 
interests of the Chekist bureaucracy.  
The question of how the great powers navigate the challenges of Metamodernism must 
necessarily address a rising, increasingly assertive China. Now entering the postmodern phase, 
China has yet to face the kind of crisis to usher in Metamodernism. It appears on the ascent and 
in contrast to both the United States and Russia, does not appear to have the misfortune of 
experiencing existential crisis in its immediate future. In his mapping of China’s historical rise in 
Rising China and its Postmodern Fate, Charles Horner described a China now “rich and 
powerful… having created… riches and the power…” but that may have “planted… the seeds of 
its possible undoing” (p. 194, 2009). While China may eventually face such a crisis, it has yet to 
do so, and therefore it’s experiences fall outside the scope of this research. 
Reaching the Culminating Point of Conflict 
International relations (IR) theory and democracy research provide a framework within 
which to assess the impact of Metamodernism on conflict and conflict resolution. Post-
modernism, Two-Level Game Theory, and theories on authoritarianism and authority help 
situate the crises explained in the foregoing paragraphs. The following section discusses the 
fundamentals of these theories and their applicability to evaluating Metamodernism within the 
context of conflict resolution. 
In evaluating the state, the basis of most IR theory, post-modernism examines violence, 
boundaries, and state identity, all features assumed inherent by traditional IR theories. 
Richard Devetak (1996) argued that post-modernism within IR theory “seeks to 
address… [the] historical constitution and reconstitution [of the sovereign state] as the primary 
mode of subjectivity in world politics” which, at its core, means assessing “how [the state] is 
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naturalized and how it is made to appear as if it had an essence.” (p. 172). Whereas traditional IR 
theories accept violence as inherent and “normal” in international relations, Devetake suggests 
that post-modernism supposes that “violence is… inaurguaral [and] augmentative” (p.173). This 
means that violence does not only exist as an instrument of state, but also contributes to its 
construction and shape.  
Devetak continues that post-modernism’s examination of state boundaries evaluates how 
“a certain configuration of space and power [is] instituted” in the contenxt of “geography… 
[produced by]… histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to 
organized, occupy, and administer space” (p. 175). This question has implications for “how 
boundaries are constituted, what moral and political status they are accorded, and how they 
operate simultaneously to include and exclude and how they… produce order and violence” (p. 
176). Sovereignty therefore does not appear immaculately but instead manifests as the 
provisional outcome of a continuous process of political and violent struggle. 
Perhaps where post-modernist most significantly deviates from traditional IR, it suggests, 
according to Devetak, that “political identity [has] been imposed by spatial practices… and [by] 
a territorially-defined self… constructed in opposition to a threatening other” (p. 176). This 
question requires an analysis of how “something which is different becomes conceptualized as a 
threat or danger…” which ultimately demands the “[allocation] the other to an inferior moral 
space, and to arrogate the self to a superior one” (p.178). 
The combination of interrogative violence, spatial exclusion shaping political order as a 
process of sovereignty, and the imposition of moral and political value on the basis of spatial 
difference form the foundation of statecraft, or state behavior. Not only does this process define 
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acceptable and unacceptable behavior amongst states, but also has implications for how state’s 
treat their populations, and what expectations populations may have their governments. 
Understanding the state as process rather than as a monolithic actor informs 
understanding of Two-Level Game Theory. First introduced by Robert Putnam (1988), the 
theory suggests that negotiators balance domestic considerations and international calculations in 
a contingent mix of possible outcomes. In Putnam’s original conception, the negotiator is an 
abstraction with assummed characteristics. But as explained in the previous sections of this 
chapter, the chief negotiators under examination (Trump and Putin) exercise power unique to 
them within a global system experiencing an inordinate amount of uncertainty and 
destablization. Given further the subjective nature of the state itself, not to mention its 
conception of security, the introduction of a power individual actor within a state’s policy 
making apparatus raises questions about how states might select desirable outcomes and assess 
likely ones.  
The strength of the individual actor within the political system, now understood to be a 
linked process at all levels, as well as the impact specifically on democratic governance, can be 
measured in part by several theories concerning authoritarianism and authority which place the 
individual at the center of an authoritarian political process.  
In creating a typology of authoritarian regimes to assess their propensity for wars and 
political stability, Brian Lai and Dan Slater (2006) defined machine authoritarianism as a form of 
oligarchic-party governance in which a small elite holds depostic power (“who decides”) and a 
political party exercises infrastructural power (“who executes”). They also defined “bossism” 
regimes as those also with a political party exercising infrastructural power but with an autocratic 
leader holding despotic power. As described in the foregoing chapters, both Trump and Putin 
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exercise some degree of authoritarian power or aspire to with the support of a party elite. 
Therefore defining the extent to which Trump and Putin fit into a measureable framework 
becomes necessary to understand how their aspirations and behavior has an impact on domestic 
and international conflict.  
After nearly 20 years in the 21st Century, a century that opened with national and global 
crises and immense technological change, both the United States and Russia occupy a precarious 
position; not only in regard to their international stature, but also in regard to their national 
identities. Into this scene enters Donald Trump, promising to “make America great again”, and 
Vladimir Putin, who promised much the same for Russia. Their political tactics, language, and 
aspirations reflect, at their core, metamodern presidencies. 
 
  34 
 
Chapter 3: Research Method 
Statement of Purpose 
Through an inter-disciplinary approach using documentary analysis, this dissertation 
examined the pervasiveness of metamodern influences in the American and Russian elite as 
represented by their countries’ respective presidents, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. 
Specifically, it aims to show the extent to which these leaders cite crisis as pretext, appeal to 
tribal identity to mobilize political power, and how they formulate and implement a response to 
the perceived threats.  
Research Objectives 
The research aimed to investigate, understand, and elaborate through discourse the views 
and beliefs of the metamodern elite by analyzing their proxies, the American and Russian 
presidents, to establish a coding framework based upon Metamodernism.  
Research Method 
The dissertation examined speeches, public statements, internal documents, biographies, 
and official policies and strategy documents of U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin. Specifically, it focused on Trump’s discourse since the announcement 
of his bid for president in 2015, and on Putin’s discourse since his assumption of high office in 
1999, until the end of 2019.  
This examination focused on the United States and Russia because of the weight of their 
political, economic, and cultural impact on international events, their recent experiences with 
crisis and instability, and their strongly held identities informed by long and rich histories. 
Additionally, for approximately the past century, American influence has ascended, making it 
the leading authority across many domains. In comparison, Russia has long strived for inclusion 
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as a world power, even as it seeks to define an identity of its own. As the leaders of these 
countries, the words and actions of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin have substantial, long-
standing impacts not only on the immediate and material, but also on the long-term shape of 
cultural norms and beliefs. These factors, as described in the literature review in more detail, 
make both countries and their presidents ideal subjects for analysis.  
A case study serves a useful purpose for this examination. According to Robert Yin 
(2014), “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon… in 
depth and within the real-world context…” (p.16). Additionally, a “case study inquiry copes with 
the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points…” (p.17). Assessing the impact of Metamodernism requires a distillation of 
examined variables consistent with available and measurable data; in this investigation, the 
speeches used by authoritarian presidents leading two world powers with substantial political, 
economic, and cultural influence. Furthermore, according to Bill Gillham (2000), “qualitative 
methods are essentially descriptive and inferential in character…” and enable the analyst to 
“explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more controlled approaches” (p. 11). This 
“[enables the analyst] to understand the meaning of what is going on” since “their great strength 
is that they can illuminate issues and turn up possible explanations” (p. 11).  In this way, case 
studies address complex problems or relationships that cannot be easily reduced to manageable 
and quantifiable variables.  Consequently, the case study “is an intensive study of a single case or 
a small number of cases which draws on observational data and promises to shed light on a 
larger population of cases” (Gerring, 2017, p. 28). The appropriateness for the case study 
approach for a complex multi-disciplinary subject as the examination of Metamodernism lies in 
the requirement for the selection of a small number of cases, in this instance the United States 
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and Russia, through which to postulate about the larger impact of Metamodernism’s 
development. 
This examination uses the United States and Russia as different cases with similar results; 
although both countries possess international prominence and have experienced significant 
national trauma in the preceeding decades, they also have different traditions, values, and 
institutional behaviors. Nevertheless, both countries produced authoritarian political figures 
intending to reshape  those traditions, values, and behaviors toward their apparent personal gain.  
Therefore, the selection of these two cases provides for consideration of how an ostensibly 
democratic society (the United States) and an authoritarian one (Russia) have come to a similar 
place, and what that place (metamodernist authoritarianism) looks like. 
Further, Yin states that “in case study research,” among the “five components of a 
research design [that] are especially important” are “the unit(s) of analysis” and “the logic of 
linking the data to the propositions” (p. 29). For this examination, content analysis forms the 
basis for constructing the units of analysis and analytical logic stipulated by Yin, and to make 
inferences about the effect(s) of Metamodernism on the presidencies of Trump and Putin. 
According to Klaus Krippendorff (2013), “content analysis is a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences” (p. 18) and “requires a context within which the available texts 
are examined,” as the “analyst must… construct a world in which the texts make sense” (p. 24). 
As described in the previous chapters, crisis forms the context of Metamodernism and the 
behaviors of the presidents of the United States and Russia. Moreover, content analysis requires 
the identification of “units… that analysts distinguish and treat as independent elements” within 
the text (p. 98). These units “emerge in processes of reading” and including “sampling units… 
that are distinguished for selective inclusion” in the analysis, while “recording/coding units… are 
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distinguished for separate description, transcription, recording, or coding” (pp. 99 – 100). The 
identification of codes and themes enables the analyst to manipulate and engage with the text in a 
meaningful way that surfaces the underlying significance of the words.  
According to Mayring (2004), “the goal of [qualitative] content analysis is the systematic 
examination of communicative material…” Although, this process started with quantitative 
methods, Mayring identified several limitations, including that “the analysis ignored the textual 
content that defined and modified the… textual units…”  Among the qualitiative methods, 
“structuring content analysis” required the “formal, content-focused typologizing” that “are then 
subdivided into individual categories…”. This system produces “coding rules [that]… result in a 
coding guide” that eases “the task of structuring.” This creates a controlled process for 
evaluating content systematically. 
Among the advantages of using qualitative content analysis within a case study, Florian 
Kohlbacher (2006) cites “openness and ability to deal with complexity” and the “integration of 
context”. Because “qualitative content analysis takes a holistic and comprehensive approach 
towards analyzing data…” it “achieves to… completely grasp and cover the complexity of the 
social situations examined,” enabling the analyst to “filter out the main points of analysis.” 
Further, because “context is… central to the interpretation and analysis of the material,” content 
analysis within the framework of a case study advances the aim to “achieve a holistic and 
comprehensive analysis of complex social phenomena.” Additionally, because a “major strength 
of case study data collection is the use of multiple sources of evidence” since “the use of 
multiple sources… allows an investigator to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and 
behavioral issues,” content analysis “offers a rule-based, theory guided method for analyzing” 
content (Kohlbacher, 2006). The complexity of understanding Metamodernism, and how it 
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pervades through the words of world leaders socialized in distinct political and cultural 
environments requires a process that can account for these many variables without sacrificing the 
fundmental object. Within the case study framework, content analysis provides a useful tool to 
study Trump and Putin as proxies for the larger and unwieldly metamodern phenomenon. 
Data Collection 
The specific documents included campaign speeches, inauguration speeches, the 
American State of the Union Address, the Russian State of the Nation address to the Federal 
Assembly, the Russian president’s annual news conference, and speeches given on special 
occasions, such as in response to national or international events and holidays, between 2000 (the 
political ascension of Putin) and 2019. It also included President Trump’s tweets, which both he 
and his administration have claimed constitute official remarks. Transcripts of these speeches 
can be found on the website of the White House and the Kremlin. Typically, at these speeches, 
leaders detail their views, value systems, and intentions. They also generally have a broad 
audience and capture national and international attention, suggesting that the speaker will 
attempt to craft the most appealing message possible within the framework of their worldview. 
Therefore, these primary speeches likely best represent not only the worldviews but also what 
the leaders consider possible to accomplish given their perception of the challenges and 
opportunities. The same applies for Trump’s tweets, through which Trump’s views can reach 
millions of people. 
The texts included 14 publicly-made speeches by Trump and and 17 speeches by Putin 
between 2000 and 2019. Additionally, it also analyzed 52 tweets made by Trump. Data 
collection ceased with the 2019 State of the Union speech given by President Trump and the 
2018 Federal Assembly speech given by President Putin. The selected speeches represent a 
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substantial amount of the two presidents’ public remarks, and therefore provide insight into the 
ideological and political frames asserted by them. The examination explored the speeches and 
tweets in totality with the categories, themes, and codes to be discussed. The selected speeches 
and tweets met the following criteria for inclusion: prominent or significant statements delivered 
by Trump or Putin to a public audience; delivered while the person held the presidential office or 
formally pursued it; and reflected upon a matter of significant public interest such as identifying 
the administration’s agenda or policy. These specific texts form the center-piece of an 
administration’s communications to the public and therefore at their core represent the ways in 
which they frame their priorities, agenda, and perception. 
Analytical Procedure: the Emergence of a Coding Framework 
Citing the documents produced by the Trump and Putin presidencies, the dissertation 
used qualitative content analysis, as described above, to examine the documents for the themes 
that pertain to the presidents’ citation of crisis as pretext, the idealization of the past as utopia, 
their appeal to tribal identity to mobilize political power, and how they formulate and implement 
a response to the perceived threats. These themes emerge from the framework of 
Metamodernism and technological evangelicalism, which asserts in part that crisis spurs identity 
conflicts, and that amidst this tension, people oscillate between two poles. The table below 
contains the following themes and categories used to examine the text. The themes and codes 
identified emerge from understanding the context of both Metamodernism broadly, and 
conditions within and around the United States and Russia specifically, as described in a 
previous chapter. In other words through a deductive process, they emerge as an understanding 
of the contexts that give meaning to the speeches analyzed by this investigation, as described by 
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the approach emphasized by Krippendorff. This dissertation tests the presence of 
Metamodernism as represented by the terms contained in the table. 
Table 1 
Metamodernism as represented by terms 
THEME CATEGORY 
CRISIS AS PRETEXT 
Environmental Crisis 
Economic Crisis 
Political Crisis 
Security Crisis 
Cultural Crisis 
THE PAST AS UTOPIA 
Patriarchy 
Oligarchy 
Values 
APPEAL TO TRIBAL IDENTITY 
White Power 
The Other 
 
RESPONSE 
Autocracy 
Methodology 
Appeals 
The centrality of crisis to the Metamodern Era places it at the forefront of this study. 
Chapter 2 described in detail the nature of the crises faced by the United States and Russia; the 
inclusion of several types of crises (environmental, economic, political, security, and cultural) 
captures the broad extent to which crisis (or a sense thereof) afflicts both countries. Additionally, 
as Metamodernism (partly) concerns itself with identify, the study therefore also explored the 
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characterization of the past as utopia and appeals to tribal identities. Specifically within the 
contexts of the United States and Russia, this includes an examination of elite power structures 
and those excluded from them. Lastly, the selected actors (Trump and Putin) respond to these 
crises and other pressures, and therefore this study also examines their language to gauge their 
response.  
The subsequent analysis examined the extent to which Trump and Putin represent 
Metamodernism (and in which areas they may not). Schreier stated that “with qualitative 
analysis, the coding frame itself can be the main result” that “[presents] the frame” and 
“[illustrates] it through quotes”.  
Phillipp Mayring (2000) also suggested a deductive category application that “works with 
prior formulated, theoretical derived aspects of analysis” and “[brings] them in connection with 
the text.” This consists of a “methodological controlled assignment of the category to a passage 
of text”, similar to the themes and codes already described previously. “The main idea,” 
according to Mayring, “is to give explicit definitions, examples and coding rules for each 
deductive category,” which are “put together within a coding agenda.” The rules suggested by 
Mayring provide a scientific-like basis establishing fundamental definitions to delineate 
boundaries between distinct concepts. This process protects against the danger of spillage 
between ideas that may eventually yield logical contradictions that could undermining the 
theoretical framework of the examination.  
Comparing these two presidents also suggests by proxy the status of the elites, 
recognizing the heterogeneity among elite classes by identifying the conflict boundaries among 
them, in their respective countries, and the influence of Metamodernism generally. Among the 
differences between the United States and Russia, the organization of their governments, the 
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origins of domestic political power, and their driving ideological impulses may be the most 
interesting areas of divergence within the context of Metamodernism. As described in the 
previous chapter, America’s government (perhaps best described as a plutocratic oligarchic 
republic) reflects the interests of an elite bound together through business and social 
relationships. Although these elites share many commonalities, there exists multiple centers of 
power which sometimes find themselves in conflict. In contrast, the so-called power vertical 
describes Russia’s government, with decisions directed from the top down, with local party 
organizations acting as implementers of the center’s will. Members of the security services 
(chekists), including Putin himself, hold the levers of power. Lastly, the United States has often 
received both acclaim and criticism as the philosophical center, defining, for better or worse, 
global frames for politics, economics, and culture. In contrast, Russia, as described in the 
preceding chapter, often attempts to mimic the West while seeking out a Russified vision of the 
object; whether it’s democracy, industrialization, or philosophy. These differences may have a 
significant influence in the popularly desired direction of either country and have consequences 
for international security and prosperity. 
Based on the discussion in the foregoing paragraph, a coding framework emerges that 
highlights the important textual units used by Trump and Putin. The following table illustrates 
how the identified codes fit into the larger framework. 
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Table 2 
Identified codes fit into the larger framework 
THEME CATEGORY CODES 
CRISIS AS PRETEXT 
Environmental Crisis Climate Change Denialism 
Economic Crisis 
Trade 
Immigration 
Living Standards 
Corruption 
Political Crisis 
Delegitamization 
Conspiracy Theories 
Corruption 
Fake News 
Security Crisis 
Terrorism 
International Security 
Global Competition 
Cultural Crisis 
Racism & Race Relations 
Immigration 
Traditions 
Family Values 
THE PAST AS UTOPIA 
Patriarchy 
N/A 
N/A 
Values Historic Examples 
APPEAL TO TRIBAL White Power Invasion 
  44 
 
IDENTITY 
The Other 
Socialism 
Terrorism 
Exceptionalism 
Nationalism 
RESPONSE 
Autocracy 
Absolute Rights 
Skepticism 
Methodology N/A 
Appeals The Base 
The analysis used by this dissertation applies mixed models of content analysis by 
starting with deduced categories suggested by an understanding of the texts’ context but moving 
through the content methodically to sharpen the provided categories, codes, and themes, and to 
identify new ones that may be of relevance. The tables above provided the “coding rules” and 
“coding guide” that eased the process of “structuring” the text, as suggested by Mayring (2004). 
Mayring (2000) also stated that using deductive categories can be “[brought]… in connection 
with the text” through “methodological… assignment of the category” to a part of the transcript. 
The analysis accomplished this by manually analyzing one document at a time with each review 
examing a document in totality to test the presence of each of the codes. The analysis assigned 
each code a color and highlighted the corresponding text to assist in creating meaningful units 
for review. This enabled greater analytical focus on the specific aspects of the texts that 
illustrated the presence of metamodernist themes. This also helped develop a thorough analysis 
of each document. The examination excluded language that did not fit into one of the above 
categories.  
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Notably, the selected texts did not include content for the cateogries of patriarchy and 
autocratic methodology. The absence of explicit commentary regarding these subjects does not 
rule out their presence in the values and beliefs of Trump or Putin (or the elites they represent), 
but instead suggests that the forum analyzed (public speeches) may not be conducive to such 
discussion. 
Methodological Summary 
This chapter discussed the research method, analytical procedures, data collection, and 
themes and codes used for this study. The examination used qualitative content analysis to test 
the presence of metamodernist themes within the specified texts. Chapter Four discusses in more 
detail the specific findings that emerged from the text and compares the language used by Trump 
and Putin. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
The examination of Presidents Trump and Putin found that while both identified the 
crises facing their respective countries and used them to advance their specific political agendas, 
they did so in ways unique to their own character and views. Whereas Trump pursued a very 
personal campaign, going so far as to reframe crisis to place him at their center, Putin articulated 
a more conservative, but equally assertive, authoritarianism. 
Crisis as Pretext 
As described in Chapter Two, Metamodernism describes a struggle between old 
difficulties and new circumstances aggravated by crisis. The War on Terrorism, political and 
economic instability, climate change, and emerging technologies all represent emergencies 
vulnerable to exploitation as pretext by opportunist political leaders.  The following sections 
describe instances in which Presidents Trump and Putin exploited crisis for political purposes. 
Citing crisis – environmental, economic, political, security, and cultural - as pretext 
served as a fundamental component of the speeches of both Trump and Putin. However, both 
emphasized different categories of crisis, and within those categories, focused on various aspects 
of them. 
Environmental Crisis. Neither President Trump nor President Putin spoke extensively 
of the environment in their selected speeches. However, Trump has engaged the subject of 
climate change and the environment in his own way through Twitter since at least 2012. As early 
as November 06, 2012, Trump now famously claimed that “the concept of global warming was 
created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive” 
(@realDonaldTrump). Trump treated the subject of the environment primarily by dismissing the 
scientific consensus on climate change while also promoting his deregulation of environmental 
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policy as actually good for the environment. In this way, Trump used environmental crisis as a 
vehicle to target his political opponents and to promote his economic populism. 
Trump’s denial of climate change frames his views on the environment. On several 
occasions, Trump dismissed or mocked the idea of climate change, specifically global warming, 
by references to localized weather. On October 19, 2015, he stated that “it’s really cold outside… 
Man, we could use a big fat dose of global warming!” Several years later, on December 28, 
2017, he stated that “it could be the COLDEST New Year’s Eve on record” [his emphasis], and 
that “perhaps we could use a little bit of that good old Global Warming…” In January 2019, 
Trump tweeted that “large parts of the Country are suffering from tremendous amounts of snow 
and near record setting cold” and that it “wouldn’t be bad to have a little of that good old 
fashioned Global Warming right now!” (realDonaldTrump). Trump’s mockery of concerns about 
climate change and the environment translated into attacks on his political opponents. 
On August 18, 2015, Trump tweeted that he will “immediately approve the Keystone XL 
pipeline” and that it would have “no impact on environment” (@realDonaldTrump). Several 
months later on November 06, 2015, Trump tweeted on the same subject, stating that President 
Obama’s rejection of the Keystone Pipeline was “sad” since the project would be “good for the 
environment” and had “no downside” (@realDonaldTrump).  In contrast, the executive summary 
of the environmental impact statement for the project from the Department of State stated that 
the pipeline would “cross approximately 1,073 waterbodies,” traverse within one mile 39 public 
water supply wells, potentially impact “13 federally protected or candidate species”, and produce 
cardon dioxide equivalent emissions to “626,000 passenger vehicles operating for one year.” 
Additionally, the project could expect a potential release, leak, or spill (U.S. Department of State, 
2013). In addition to President Obama, Trump also ridiculed U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar, 
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observing that she was “talking proudly of fighting global warming while standing in a virtual 
blizzard of snow, ice and freezing temperatures” and that “she looked like a Snowman” 
(@realDonaldTrump). On September 04, 2019, Trump claimed that “the Democrats’ destructive 
“environmental” proposals will raise your energy bill and prices at the pump,” rhetorically 
asking, “don’t the Democrats care about fighting American poverty?” (@realDonaldTrump). 
Trump did not limit his political attacks to domestic opponents. He also derided the 
country of France, asking on March 16, 2019, “How is the Paris Environmental Accord working 
out for France… I guess not so well! In the meantime, the United States has gone to the top of all 
the lists on the Environment.” He previously stated on December 08, 2018, that “the Paris 
Agreement isn’t working out so well for Paris” because of the “protests and riots all over France” 
from “people [who] do not want to pay large sums of money… to maybe protect the 
environment” (@realDonaldTrump).  
Even as he expressed climate change denialism and attacked his political opponents while 
using the environment as a bludgeon, President Trump paradoxically also tried to promote his 
own policies as good for the environment. He summarized his views on April 22, 2017 by stating 
that he is “committed to keeping our air and water clean” but that people should “always 
remember that economic growth enhances environmental protection” (@realDonaldTrump). 
Even as wildfires ravaged California in 2018, Trump claimed that the disasters were “magnified 
& made so much worse by the bad environmental laws” rather than climate change 
(@realDonaldTrump). The targeting of California continued in 2019 when the Trump 
administration moved to revoke California’s federal waiver on vehicle emissions, the toughest 
standards in the country. Trump stated in September 2019 that his decision would “produce far 
less expensive cars for the consumer” while “older, highly polluting cars will be replaced by 
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extremely environmentally friendly cars” (@realDonaldTrump). Even as Trump dismantled the 
regulatory protections for the environment and ridiculed both U.S. and international remedies for 
climate problems, he still felt compelled to promote his policies within the frame of 
environmental protectionism, recognizing it as a (political) positive good. 
In this way, President Trump turned environmental crisis to his political advantage, 
virtually ignoring contradictory scientific findings to mobilize popular support by attacking the 
rational environmental policies of his political opposition. Crisis in the Trump context did not 
mean climate change or global warming, but instead costly environmental regulations and 
political agreements that affected consumer prices and economic growth. When Trump did 
discuss environmental problems, he cited them as pretext for actions against his political 
opposition or for dismantling regulatory protections. 
The environment, and the recognition of an environmental crisis, did not feature 
prominently in Putin’s statements. Given Russia’s long-time place as a net energy exporter with 
resources extraction industries as major sources of economic power, it should not be surprising 
that environmental concerns did not draw much attention from the government. As early as 2006, 
President Putin raised issues of the environment in the context of energy production and 
consumption, stating that it is a question of “environmental security and quality of life” (2006). 
He briefly raised environmental issues in his 2012 speech to the Federal Assembly, stating that 
“we should pay very close attention to environmental issues…” and use “high quality 
environmental standards of development” (2012). In his 2016 Federal Assembly speech, Putin 
made another brief reference to the environment, citing “environmental protection legislation” as 
an area where civil society should take an active part and declaring 2017 the “Year of the 
Environment”. In 2018, he asserted that the government had “tightened environmental 
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requirements” to “reduce industrial pollution”. This generally correlated with increasing 
international alarm about climate change, suggesting a desire to resolve the structural tension 
between Russia’s economic power and shifting international priorities. 
Unsurprisingly, the environment did not occupy a prominent role in Trump’s speeches, 
given his consistent denial about the dangers (and even existence) of climate change. To the 
extent that Trump even discussed the environment, he framed it as about jobs and the economy. 
Instead of addressing criticism about environmental hazards, he embraced controversial projects 
like the Keystone Pipeline. He also famously once called climate change a hoax manufactured by 
the Chinese to gain economic advantage over the United States. He further asserted that his 
deregulatory policies would actually be good for the environment. Overall, Trump soundly 
rejected any idea of a climate crisis occurring, even as parts of his political base in rural 
communities suffer from its consequences. Instead, he reframed the idea of an environmental 
crisis into a weapon to attack his political opponents on the economy and economic regulations.  
For his part, Putin made little mention of the environment generally, and made no 
specific references to an environmental crisis. Given Russia’s economic dependence on energy 
production and resource extraction, Putin’s references to environmental regulation within the 
context of economic development should not be surprising. To that extent that Putin mentioned 
the environment at all, he did so only as part of larger conversations about instituting policies to 
improve Russia’s economic performance. 
Economic Crisis. Both President Trump and President Putin spoke extensively about the 
economy and economic problems facing their respective countries. While Putin struck a more 
traditional and policy-oriented tone to address economic problems, Trump focused instead on 
emphasizing economic crisis and converting it into political capital. For Trump, like the 
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environmental crisis, the economic crisis did not consist of the traditionally recognized 
identification of the problem (e.g. economic inequality, recessionary cycles, etc), but instead on 
the treatment of the U.S. in trade agreements and economic costs imposed on American business. 
Trump frequently referenced jobs, taxes, and trade within the context of grievance. 
When announcing his candidacy for the presidency on June 16, 2015, Trump almost 
immediately invoked trade problems and economic crisis. He rhetorically asked about “the last 
time anybody saw us beating… China in a trade deal” and lamented that the Japanese, in regard 
to trade, “beat us all the time.” In the same speech, Trump also claimed the unemployment 
number to be “anywhere from 18 to 19 and maybe even 21 percent,” asserting the official 
statistic, 5.6%, to be “full of nonsense” (Peters & Woolley, 2015). This theme continued in 
Trump’s speech for accepting the nomination of the Republican Party, identifying “trade deals 
that strip us of our jobs, and strip us of our wealth” as one of the largest political issues (Peters & 
Wooley, 2016). His inauguration speech, noted for its cynicism, further pressed this claim, 
claiming that America “made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of 
our country has disappeared…” and that “factories shuttered and left our shores, with not even a 
thought about the millions upon millions of American workers left behind.” He continued by 
stating that “the wealth of our middle class has been ripped from their homes and then 
redistributed across the entire world” (Peters & Woolley, 2017).  
In his 2017 State of the Union speech, Trump explicitly tied U.S. economic fortunes with 
immigration and criminal violence. He asserted that “protecting our workers also means 
reforming our system of legal immigration,” which currently “depresses wages for our poorest 
workers and puts great pressure on taxpayers.” He later claimed that to “break the cycle of 
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poverty, we must also break the cycle of violence,” leading into an argument about supporting 
law enforcement and taking action against illegal immigration (White House, 2017).  
Although Trump did not appeal to economic crisis in his 2018 State of the Union speech, 
and only made  a passing reference to it in his 2019 State of the Union speech (“Another historic 
trade blunder was the catastrophe known as NAFTA” (White House, 2019), he frequently 
discussed economic problems on Twitter. Notably, prior to his election Trump lambasted 
President Obama and Democrats for a supposedly awful economy and trade agreements. After 
Trump’s election, this rhetoric almost immediately shifted to claiming historic levels of 
economic performance. 
In regard to trade, Trump tweeted on June 03, 2015, that “the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
will increase our trade deficits & send even more jobs overseas.” Later that month, on June 27, 
he claimed that “only very stupid people think that the United States is making good trade deals 
with Mexico” and that “Mexico is killing us… at trade!” He also criticized economic 
performance, tweeting on April 30, 2016, that “the economy is bad and getting worse – almost 
ZERO growth this quarter” (@realDonaldTrump). 
Trump included trade as one of the main subjects of his United Nations speech in 2018, 
stating that “the United States lost over 3 million manufacturing jobs… after China joined the 
[World Trade Organization]” and that America has accrued “$13 trillion in trade deficits…” 
(White House, 2018).  
Trump’s commentary across his speeches and tweets did not formulate any rationalized 
policy or scientifically grounded conclusions about causes, but instead focused on defining the 
parameters of an economic crisis politically convenient for himself. Trump blamed easily 
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identifiable economic enemies, like China and Mexico, and at times linked economic issues with 
cultural and political frictions, especially immigration. 
In contrast to Trump, although President Putin extensively discussed economic problems 
facing his country, he did so in a logical, policy-focused, and somewhat boring way. He 
discussed many of the same issues as Trump but placed them rationally within a larger political 
program. 
A few minutes into his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly in 2001, only the second 
since his election the previous year, Putin stated that “our people continue to have very low 
living standards” and that the country has “very serious economic and social risks.” He also 
expressed concern for “worsening of a number of key economic indicators.” Throughout the 
lengthy speech, he cited many problems, including the country’s “unfavorable business climate,” 
the comparatively small market value of Russia’s largest private corporations, corruption in the 
privatization of state monopolies, and weak corporate governance (Kremlin, 2001). 
The economy remained an important part of speeches through to his Federal Assembly 
statement in 2018, where he stated that the government’s priority should be to the “well-being of 
the people and the prosperity of Russian families.” However, rather than speak about the 
structural problems he addressed almost twenty years earlier, this speech focused on living 
standards, such as minimum wage, job creation, mortgages, and pensions (Kremlin, 2018). This 
shift in focus gives strength to the claim that Putin mobilized grievance for political gain; after 
two decades in power, Putin cannot nurse criticisms about domestic conditions without 
undermining his own authority and legitimacy. 
Putin’s speeches, though speaking to deeply rooted economic problems, did not include 
the alarmist rhetoric employed by Trump. Putin delivered his statements matter-of-factly and 
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demonstrated a grasp of policy details not present in Trump’s speeches. Putin also refrained from 
recasting economic problems as political vehicles to attack his political opposition, although he 
emphasized the importance of economic power for Russia’s great power status, proclaiming that 
“Russia must firmly assert itself among the five largest global economies” (Kremlin, 2018).  
The idea of an economic crisis featured prominently in Trump’s statements. He regularly 
focused on jobs, taxes, trade, and class issues, even connecting other perceived problems, such as 
immigration, to them. However, Trump’s framing of an economic crisis did not follow generally 
accepted views about economic inequality, and the need for reforms in various sectors such as 
student loan debt, pay disparities, and international free trade. Instead, Trump subordinated 
economic concerns to his own political purposes, and reshaped them for his own ends. 
When speaking of jobs, taxes, trade, and class, Trump asserted that Democratic elites, 
foreign states, and illegal immigrants exploited a benevolent United States to the detriment of 
Americans. In this way, Trump sought to deconstruct accepted norms and scientific findings 
about economic problems to replace them with his own personally favorable vision of economic 
conditions. He weaponized these views to force through various policies, including corporate tax 
cuts, a ban on immigration from specific countries, refusing asylum seekers, and building a wall 
on the American-Mexican border. By leveraging these claims, Trump mobilized the insecurities 
and prejudices of large portions of the American public to accomplish his political aims. 
President Putin offered a much more subdued, but also a very sobering, view of Russia’s 
economic crisis. He acknowledged the significant problems caused by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as well as the corruption and inefficiency undermining Russia’s transition to a market 
economy. Putin fit these concerns within a larger narrative about Russia recapturing its great 
power status. He used this opportunity to advocate economic policies that favored his view of a 
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renewed Russia, including reinvestments in strategic military projects and other undertakings 
that increased the country’s prestige. By the end of the period under review, Putin’s statements 
shifted from descriptions of the country’s poor economic conditions to emphasizing its 
accomplishments during his years in power. 
Political Crisis. Given Trump’s laser-like focus on his own political destiny, he has 
unsurprisingly expended a significant amount of verbal ammunition regarding a perceived  
political crisis in the country. Like the economy, Trump has framed the political crisis as the 
opposition to his political fortunes, attempting to delegitimize the opposition, dismiss dissidence, 
make accusations of fake news, and obstruct investigations into his conduct, all the while 
ignoring the impact of his actions upon the country’s constitutional stability.  
Trump’s attempts to delegitimize the opposition started with the promotion of conspiracy 
theories and the introduction of insulting nick-names for specific political targets. He infamously 
promoted the conspiracy theory denying President Obama’s birth in the United States 
(Abramovitz, 2018). More recently, he has promoted, and used the powers of the presidency in 
an attempt to substantiate, claims that Joe Biden, when Vice President, interfered in Ukraine’s 
justice system to protect his own son from criminal investigation (Mayer, 2019). In response to 
Democratic investigation about his claims, he tweeted on October 04, 2019 that he has “an 
obligation to end CORRUPTION, even if that means requesting the help of a foreign country…” 
and that his efforts have “NOTHING to do with politics… against the Bidens…” but it has to 
“do with their corruption!” (@realDonaldTrump). 
Aside from trafficking in conspiracy theories, Trump also attempted to delegitimize the 
opposition by appending nicknames and referring to his opponents by their first names rather 
than their titles. During the Republican primary of the 2016 presidential election, he referred to 
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competing Republicans Jeb Bush as “low energy”, Ted Cruz as “Lyin Ted”, and Marco Rubio as 
“Little Marco Rubio.” In 2016, Trump regularly referred to Hillary Clinton as “Crooked 
Hillary,” asserting she had “ZERO leadership ability”. He also called potential 2020 election 
opponent Joe Biden as “Crazy Joe Biden”.  Aside from electoral competitors, Trump has also 
used nicknames against leaders of Congress who have opposed his policies and investigated his 
conduct, including Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (“Nervous Nancy”), Senator Chuck 
Schumer (“Cryin Chuck”), Representative Adam Schiff (“Sleazy Adam Schiff” and “Shift Adam 
Schiff”) (@realDonaldTrump).  
In November 2017, Trump introduced the conspiracy theory of a “Deep State” of 
intelligence officials and political operatives conspiring against him. On November 29h, he 
tweeted about the then-Republican controlled House of Representatives pressuring the FBI to 
release documents about its investigation into the Trump campaign, calling it “Big Stuff… Deep 
State… Give this information now!” On September 06, 2018, Trump tweeted that “The Deep 
State and the Left, and their vehicle, the Fake News Media, are going crazy” in reaction to 
Trump’s self-proclaimed accomplishments. He also included the whistleblower about his July 
2019 phone call with the President of Ukraine in the Deep State, saying “the first so-called 
second hand information ‘whistleblower’ got my phone conversation completely wrong, so 
now… another ‘whistleblower’ is coming in from the Deep State…” (@realDonaldTrump). 
In addition to conspiracy theories and name-calling, Trump also called for investigations 
and even imprisonment for his political opponents, some of whom he described as traitors or 
treasonous in their conduct. During the Special Counsel investigation examining the Trump 
campaign’s alleged electoral coordination with the Government of Russia, Trump tweeted on 
March 03, 2017 a photo of Senator Schumer with President Putin, and stated, “We should start 
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an immediate investigation into @SenSchumer and his ties to Russia and Putin”. On the same 
day, he tweeted another photo between delegations of the American Congress, including Nancy 
Pelosi, and a Russian political delegation, stating, “I hereby demand a second investigation, after 
Schumer, of Pelosi for her close ties to Russia, and lying about it” (@realDonaldTrump). In 
May, 2019, Trump partially fulfilled his own demands, directing Attorney General William Barr 
to investigate the predication of the Special Counsel’s investigation. On May 17, 2019, Trump 
tweeted that “my campaign for President was conclusively spied on… TREASON means long 
jail sentences, and this was TREASON!” In September 2019, Trump tweeted that “Rep. Adam 
Schiff illegally made up a FAKE & terrible statement… Arrest for Treason?” The next month, 
Trump tweeted that “Nancy Pelosi knew all of the many Shifty Adam Schiff lies and massive 
frauds…” which makes her “every bit as guilty… for High Crimes and Misdemeanors, and even 
Treason,” requiring that they “must all be immediately impeached!” (@realDonaldTrump).   
As a part of his strategy to demonize his political opposition, Trump made numerous 
denunciations about claims he characterized as fake news and dismissed negative media 
coverage with the same term. In response to growing concerns about his campaign’s alleged 
coordination with the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election, on February 16, 
2017, he claimed “The Democrats had to come up with a story as to why they lost the election… 
so they made up a story – Russia… fake news!” Earlier that month, he had claimed that “any 
negative polls are fake news.” The next month, as the interest in the Russia matter gained 
momentum, he asked via tweet “why doesn’t the Fake News talk about Podesta ties to Russia… 
or money from Russia to Clinton…?” In January 2019, he tweeted that “Fake News is truly the 
ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE” in reference to news media organizations. Following the opening of 
the impeachment inquiry by the House of Representatives in 2019 for alleged abuse of office, he 
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tweeted that “the Fake News Media wants to stay as far as way as possible from the Ukraine and 
China deals made by the Bidens” and that the “[Corrupt] Media may be even more Corrupt than 
the Bidens…” (@realDonaldTrump). 
The invective in Trump’s speeches directed against his opponents did not rise to the same 
level of his tweets, but occasionally the same themes about the opposition and fake news 
appeared. In his 2015 announcement to run for President, he stated that American politicians 
“will never make American great again” because “they’re controlled fully by the lobbyists, by 
the donors, and by the special interests, fully.” In the same speech, he later rhetorically asked 
“how stupid are our leaders?” He later continued this theme, stating that China’s “leaders are 
much smarter than our leaders… our leaders don’t understand the game…” Near the end of the 
speech, he said, “We have losers… we have people that are morally corrupt… we have people 
that are selling this country down the drain” (Peters & Woolley, 2015). In his 2016 nomination 
acceptance speech, he criticized Hillary Clinton’s “bad instincts” and “bad judgment”, 
characterizing her legacy as “death, destruction, terrorism, and weakness” (Peters & Woolley, 
2016). In his 2019 State of the Union Speech, Trump stated that “ridiculous partisan 
investigations”, in reference to the Special Counsel, could obstruct his “economic miracle. He 
continued by claiming that “if there is going to be peace and legislation, there cannot be war and 
investigation” (White House, 2019). 
In his One Hundred Days speech, Trump claimed that “there are 24 million voter 
registrations… that are either invalid or significantly inaccurate…” and that “1.8 million dead 
people are registered to vote and some of them are voting,” with another “2.8 million people… 
registered in more than one state” and “fourteen percent of non-citizens… registered to vote” 
(Peters & Woolley, 2016). 
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Given the subjectivity of knowledge and perspective in the metamodern context, 
reinforced by the material productive powers of information technology, the fixation on fake 
news and conspirarcy theories suggests an underlying hegemonic contest to achieve message 
dominance; an ever important objective in a world in which the boundaries of information and 
identity become increasingly contingent on individual positions. 
Trump’s exploitation of the public’s cynicism to spin a story of political crisis centered 
around him contrasted with the Russian president’s characterization of political crisis. Early in 
Putin’s years in office, he defined the political crisis as strengthening Russia’s constitutional 
order and political stability. In a speech accompanying the submission of bills for consideration 
by the Russian legislation, Putin described various political problems, which he summed up as “a 
dictatorship of the law.” He asserted that a “state is not simply a piece of land… it is, above all, 
constitutional order and discipline” and that “if these instruments are weak, so is the state… or it 
just does not exist” (Kremlin, 2000). In his 2001 Federal Assembly speech, Putin said that “a key 
issue for any state authorities is how much the country’s people trust the state.”  He continued by 
stating that this trust “depends directly on how well the state protects [the people] from the 
arbitrary actions of racketeers, bandits and bribe takers.” He further described problems with 
Russia’s legislative system and law enforcement, which fomented corrupt practices and abusive 
acts (Kremlin, 2001).  
By 2018, discussion about political crisis had all but disappeared from Putin’s formal 
addresses. Having held power for almost twenty years, he likely could no longer reasonably 
articulate a political crisis since it would reflect poorly upon his actions and his government. In 
his 2016 Federal Assembly speech, Putin embraced continued strides towards direct democracy 
and competitive elections (despite widespread international condemnation about increasing 
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authoritarianism in Russia), and claimed that the State Duma had “bolstered its role as a 
representative body,” which contributed to “[proving] that [Russians] live in a healthy society 
that is confident in its fair and just demands, has ever stronger immunity against populism… and 
values highly the importance of solidarity, closeness, and unity” (Kremlin, 2016). Indirectly, 
Putin claimed victory over the political challenges he had faced two decades earlier. 
Political crisis fit prominently within Trump’s public statements. He framed political 
crisis to his own advantage, focusing on delegitimizing the political opposition and dissent, 
propagating falsehoods while dismissing criticism as fake news, and combating investigations 
while attempting to instigate his own against his rivals. 
Trump repeatedly sought to delegitimize his political opposition, dissidence against his 
political aims (and his person), characterized accusations as fake news, and dismissed 
investigations into his conduct while calling for investigations into his adversaries. In this way, 
Trump often solicited political crisis by pursuing policies or undertaking actions at odds with 
established norms or accepted views of legal possibilities. He also habitually spread conspiracy 
theories and provable falsehoods. Rather than repair the American public’s disdain of the 
government, Trump’s actions sharpened partisanship, simultaneously demolishing confidence in 
his government held by the opposition while undermining the legitimacy of his rivals among his 
loyalists.  Not only did Trump recognize a political crisis, he diligently worked to craft one that 
would work to his advantage. 
In contrast, Putin recognized a political crisis that emerged in the decade following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union that left a constitutionally weak Russia in its place. Putin’s early 
speeches emphasized the importance of restoring constitutional order and improving the 
country’s internal stability, including combating separatist movements. As with the economy, 
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after a nearly twenty years in power, Putin’s rhetoric shifted to emphasizing the 
accomplishments of his government. This change reflected reality insofar as threats to Russia’s 
stability had been suppressed by an authoritarian state that also repressed civil society, including 
free speech and media, and direct democratic participation in government, despite claims to the 
contrary. Putin’s use of democratic language underscores his concerns about public and 
international legitimacy even as democratic norms erode worldwide. Popular uprisings in former 
Soviet states, particularly Ukraine, potentially alarm Putin who must balance his authoritarian 
desires with the democratic aspirations of the public. Even as Putin claims victory over one 
political crisis, he fosters another one. 
Security Crisis. Like with other issues, Trump crafted images of security crisis, using it 
as a vehicle to target his political enemies and promote himself, while offering no details on 
policy remedies. When announcing his candidacy for president, Trump first cited terrorism as a 
crisis, asking, “How are [the other candidates] going to beat ISIS?” He later continued with other 
comments about the Middle East: “Iran is taking over Iraq”, “We spent $2 trillion in Iraq… we 
lost thousands of lives… and we have nothing…” He later shifted from war in the Middle East to 
American military power, “our enemies are getting stronger… and we… are getting weaker… 
even our nuclear arsenal doesn’t work” (Peters & Woolley, 2015). During his nomination 
acceptance speech in 2016, Trump stated that Americans “lived through one international 
humiliation after another,” citing an incident with Iran in which “our sailors [were] forced to 
their knees by their Iranian captors…” He followed by stating that the “Iran deal… will go down 
in history as one of the worst deals ever negotiated.” He concluded that “America is far less 
safe… than when Obama made the decision to put Hillary Clinton in charge of… foreign 
policy,” citing “Libya is in ruins… Egypt was turned over to the radical Muslim brotherhood… 
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Iraq is in chaos… the situation is worse than it has ever been before” as examples (Peters & 
Woolley, 2016). 
Later in 2016, while giving a speech on the proposals for his first 100 days in the Oval 
Office, Trump said America has had “misguided military adventures overseas and wars that go 
on forever… they don’t know how to win the wars…” In the same speech, he later claimed that 
“we are talking in thousands of thousands” of refugees and “we have no idea who they are… 
radical Islamic terror is right around corner.” (Peters & Woolley, 2016). After winning office, 
Trump only made a passing reference to security in his inauguration speech, stating, “we’ve 
defended other nation’s borders while refusing to defend our own” (Peters & Woolley, 2017).  
The sporadic identification of security problems, namely terrorism, but also Iran, North 
Korea, and the conditions of the U.S. military, continued into his time in office. In the 2017 State 
of the Union speech, Trump claimed that Justice Department data proved that “the vast majority 
of individuals convicted of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses since 9/11 came here from 
outside our country” (White House, 2017). The next year’s State of the Union did not include 
any references to security issues at all (White House, 2018). Unsurprisingly, Trump’s speech to 
the United Nations in 2018 referred to a number of perceived security crises. He claimed that 
“Iran’s leaders sow chaos, death, and destruction” and that “Iran’s leaders plunder the nation’s 
resources to… spread mayhem…” He concluded that the “Iran deal was a windfall for Iran’s 
leaders…” allowing them to “increase internal repression, finance terrorism, and fund havoc and 
slaughter…” In the 2019 State of the Union speech, he said that “our brave troops have been 
fighting in the Middle East for almost 19 years” and that “we have spent more than $7 trillion in 
the Middle East” (White House, 2019).  
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Unlike his formal speeches, Trump’s twitter account contained frequent references to 
security issues. He regularly complained about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the 
“Iran deal”), saying on July 28, 2015 that it “will go down as one of the dumbest & most 
dangerous misjudgments entered into in history of our country…” Earlier that month, he stated 
the deal “poses a direct national security threat.” He also spoke about terrorism, saying on 
December 08, 2015, that “our country is facing a major threat from radical Islamic terrorism,” 
for which he blamed the Democrats in another tweet several weeks later: “it’s the Democrats’ 
total weakness & incompetence that gave rise to ISIS.” He also blamed Hillary Clinton 
specifically, tweeting on May 21, 2016 that “Crooked Hillary Clinton’s foreign interventions 
unleashed ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya” (@realDonaldTrump).  
Although Trump’s speeches selected for this examination only explicitly named the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as part of the security problem once, he frequently 
made clear his views on Twitter. On March 14, 2016, Trump stated that “N.A.T.O is obsolete 
and must be changed to additionally focus on terrorism…” The remainder of Trump’s comments 
about NATO principally focused on the amount alliance members spent for defense 
expenditures.  On June 10, 2018, Trump tweeted that America “[protects] Europe… at great 
financial loss, and then get unfairly clobbered on trade.” The next month, Trump tweeted that 
“many countries in NATO, which we are expected to defend, are… short of their current 
commitment of 2%... will they reimburse the U.S.?” (@realDonaldTrump).  
Like Trump, Putin focused on security from the beginning of his tenure. Unlike Trump, 
Putin articulated clearly defined security problems, starting with internal security and eventually 
concerning international security. In the shadow of the long shadow of the Soviet collapse, 
Russia’s stability and sovereignty occupied a central place in Putin’s security concerns. 
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In his 2001 speech to the Federal Assembly, Putin called upon the country “to show a 
sense of responsibility” in resolving the problem of Chechen separatism (Kremlin, 2001). Not 
until the 2002 Federal Assembly speech did Putin raise the issue of military reform to move the 
country towards a “professional army while reducing the term of service by conscription.” He 
also reasserted Russia’s role as “one of the most reliable guarantors of international stability,” 
connecting it to the issue of international terrorism. He claimed that Russia “has faced terrorism 
for a long time” and that “the war with international terrorism” also “fully applies to Russia” 
(Kremlin, 2002).  In response to the Beslan school attack in 2004, Putin stated that “[Russians] 
are living through a time when internal conflicts and interethnic divisions… have now flared up” 
and that “our country… overnight found itself defenceless…” He asserted that “we showed 
ourselves to be weak… and the weak get beaten.” He further claimed that “we have found 
ourselves confronting crises, revolts, and terrorist acts…” which constitute “a challenge to all of 
Russia, to our entire people.” (Kremlin, 2014).  
By the 2006 Federal Assembly speech, Putin had dedicated more time to discussing 
security issues in detail. He described a condition in which “the structure of the country’s armed 
forces was not in keeping with the reality of today’s situation…” and that the “armed forces were 
no longer receiving any modern equipment.” He also stated that “a huge number of young men 
of conscript age today suffer from chronic diseases” (Kremlin, 2006). In his 2012 Federal 
Assembly speech, he rhetorically asked “What will guarantee Russia’s sovereignty in the 21st 
century?” He answered that “Russia must not only preserve its geopolitical relevance” but also 
“multiply it…” and “generate demand among our neighbors.” Russia, he asserted, must have the 
“ability to mobilize collective actions at the international level” and possess the “military might 
that guarantees Russia’s security and independence” (2012).  
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In his 2013 Federal Assembly speech, Putin observed that the “intensity of military, 
political, economic, and informational competition throughout the world is… only getting 
stronger” with “other power centers… closely monitoring Russia’s progress as it grows stronger” 
(2013). This speech in particular addressed a long list of security issues, including the Syrian 
civil war, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and protests in Ukraine. He warned about other powers 
attempting to “push supposedly more progressive development models onto other nations…” At 
the end of the speech, Putin dedicated a substantial amount of time discussing the development 
of Russia’s military forces, warning that “no one should entertain any illusions about achieving 
military superiority over Russia” because Russia’s “military doctrine and advanced weapons… 
will unconditionally allow [Russia] to ensure the security of the… state” (2013).  
Security continued to play a central role in Putin’s speeches in 2014. In the speech to the 
Federal Assembly that year, he condemned European intervention in Ukraine as “actions…aimed 
against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration.” He continued by claiming that the 
West “lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs…” and that “we are against 
having a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our historic territory” 
(2014). He characterized this position as consistent with sovereignty, stating that “every nation 
has an inalienable sovereign right to determine its own… path, choose allies and political 
regimes, create an economy and ensure its security…” (2014). 
The next year’s speech in 2015 placed an emphasis on terrorism following Russia’s 
intervention in the Syrian civil war. Putin claimed that Russia deployed its military forces to 
“repel the terrorist threat” and that “everyone must be aware of their responsibility.” He 
concluded that Russia’s “military personnel are fighting in Syria for Russia, for the security of 
Russian citizens” (2015). 
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By 2018, Putin felt sufficiently confident to claim that “no one has managed to restrain 
Russia” despite the country’s difficulty in the years following the Soviet collapse. He stated that 
“the entire world knows the names of our newest planes, submarines, anti-aircraft weapons, 
as well as land-based, airborne and sea-based guided missile systems” and that “all of them are 
cutting-edge, high-tech weapons.” He asserted that “the holes [that] appeared after the USSR 
disintegrated… were repaired” during his presidency (2018). With Russia’s new military 
confidence, Putin declared that “Russia’s growing military power is a solid guarantee of global 
peace…” and will “remain a key factor of international security…” (2018).  
Trump occasionally referred to a security crisis, making references to military conflicts, 
terrorism, and American alliances with NATO, Japan, and South Korea. Trump framed these 
issues with a concept generally defined as “America First” in which the United States would 
place its interests, as defined by Trump, ahead of its international obligations to alliances and 
international institutions. He capitalized upon the public’s exhaustion with the War on Terrorism 
while exploiting insecurities of the next possible terrorist attack and general disinterest in 
international affairs. Rather than crafting a coherent strategy that objectively improved American 
security, Trump embraced his disdain and indifference about external obligations, going so far as 
to unilaterally withdraw from multiple joint security operations, such as the campaign against 
ISIS in Syria.  
Initially Trump used security problems as a political cudgel against his opponents to 
accuse them of weakness but once in office, used it to advance his personal agenda. He regularly 
connected security issues, such as terrorism, with cultural and economic ones, such as 
immigration. He used this conflation of issues to push through controversial policies, including 
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taking funds from the military budget to build a border wall and demanding that American allies 
finance U.S. military operations around the world. 
Whereas Trump wrapped security issues around his personal fortunes, Putin framed a 
security crisis around Russia’s weakness internationally that invited challengers to Russian 
interests. He acknowledged that Russia lost a significant amount of its economic production and 
military capacity when the Soviet Union dissolved. Putin’s commentary on security therefore 
focused on restoring Russia’s great power status, reestablishing the country’s constitutional 
stability, and rehabilitating the country’s military capabilities. The speeches form a fairly clear 
arch from concerns about Russia’s sovereignty to an assertive resurgent power having 
rediscovered its confidence, openly challenging the United States and the West. 
Cultural Crisis. President Trump spoke extensively about a perceived cultural crisis, 
focusing his statements on race, religion, abortion, anti-expertise, and immigration.  Infamously, 
when announcing his candidacy for the president, Trump stated, “When Mexico sends its people, 
they’re not sending their best… they’re sending people with lots of problems… they’re bringing 
drugs… crime… rapists…” (Peters & Woolley, 2015). During his nomination acceptance 
speech, Trump claimed that “nearly 180,000 illegal immigrants with criminal records… are 
tonight roaming free to threaten peaceful citizens.” He continued that “illegal immigrant 
families… are being released by the tens of thousands into our communities with no regard for… 
public safety…” He cited a specific example where a “border-crosser” in Nebraska killed 21-
years-old Sarah Root, whom he described as “one more child to sacrifice... on the altar of open 
borders.” In this speech, he also announced his intention to “immediately suspend immigration 
from any nation that has been compromised by terrorism…” (Peters & Woolley, 2016). 
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Trump also targeted minority groups with his rhetoric, specifically African-Americans, 
vacillating between describing their living conditions as awful while also promoting his policies 
as their salvation. In his acceptance speech, Trump said that “nearly four in 10 African-American 
children are living in poverty, while 58% of African American youth are now not employed.” He 
explicitly linked this issue with immigration, claiming that “decades of record immigration have 
produced lower wages and higher unemployment for our citizens, especially… African 
Americans and Latino workers” (Peters & Woolley, 2016). 
On January 08, 2019, Trump gave a speech from the White House regarding immigration 
and his proposed border wall solution. During his statements, Trump described the situation as a 
“growing humanitarian and security crisis.” He claimed that Americans “are hurt by 
uncontrolled, illegal migration” because it “strains public resources and drives down jobs and 
wages…” with the “hardest hit [being] African Americans and Hispanic Americans.” He defined 
the southern U.S. border as a “pipeline for vast quantities of illegal drugs” which, he alleged, that 
“90 percent… floods across from our southern border…” and kills more Americans than died in 
the Vietnam War. He attempted to further substantiate his claims with statistics, stating that in 
the previous two years, the government had arrested 266,000 “aliens with criminal records, 
including… 100,000 assaults, 30,000 sex crimes, and 4,000 violent killings…” with “thousands 
of Americans… brutally killed by those who illegally entered… and thousands more lives will be 
lost if we don’t act…” (Martinez, 2019). 
Putin also occasionally alluded to a cultural crisis. In his 2012 Federal Assembly speech, 
he lamented that “many moral guides have been lost…” and that people have a willingness to 
“tolerate corruption, brazen greed, [and] manifestations of extremism and offensive behavior.” 
He warned that this would “create long-term threats to society, security, and even [the] integrity 
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of Russia” (2012). This theme continued in the 2013 Federal Assembly speech in which he 
asserted that “many nations are revising their moral values and ethical norms, eroding ethnic 
traditions…” and requiring people to “accept… the equality of good and evil.” He declared that 
the “destruction of traditional values from above… leads to negative consequences… is also… 
anti-democratic since it is… contrary to the will of the majority…” (2013). 
In the next year’s Federal Assembly speech, Putin emphasized that his “priorities are 
health families and a healthy nation, the traditional values which we inherited from our 
forefathers… and the guaranteed security of Russia…” (2014). By 2019, he claimed that his 
government has “been doing everything in our power to strengthen family values” since “our 
future is at stake”, with the “task shared by the state, civil society, religious organizations, 
political parties, and the media” (2019). 
Although Trump cited a cultural crisis, he almost exclusively focused on immigration, 
while using dog whistles for race and anti-intellectualism. In comparison, he rarely raised issues 
of religion and abortion. 
Trump explicitly made immigration and terrorism part of his framing of the country’s 
cultural crisis, which he captured in his campaign slogan of “Make America Great Again.” He 
regularly connected immigration and terrorism together, as well as to other issues such as jobs 
and crime. He rarely championed the causes of minorities, instead using them as props or 
employing a white savior strategy to suggest his actions would somehow benefit all Americans, 
rather than just white Americans. This served to amplify, not resolve, the sense of cultural crisis 
in the country and to mobilize political support.  
Putin’s earliest speeches did not reflect on Russia’s cultural integrity. As time passed, he 
became increasingly concerned for the country’s morals and explicitly connected them to 
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Russia’s security and future. He did not articulate any comprehensive philosophy, but it made 
clear that preserving the country’s values depended upon all Russians. 
The Past as Utopia 
Despite the official campaign slogan of “Make America Great Again,” President Trump 
only selectively and rarely alluded to the past as an ideal form to emulate. During his 
announcement to run for President, Trump stated, “we need somebody that can take the brand of 
the United States and make it great again…” (Peters & Woolley, 2015), where he inadvertently 
coined the term that would define his campaign. In his One Hundred Days speech, Trump 
appealed to the example of Abraham Lincoln, the first Republican president, as someone who 
“served at a time of division” (Peters & Woolley, 2016), as public, political, and legal opposition 
began to mount against his administration. Similarly, he referred to “Another Republican 
president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, [who] initiated the last truly great national infrastructure 
program – the building of the Interstate Highway System” (Peters & Woolley, 2017) as a way to 
prod for support for an oft-touted infrastructure renewal program. In a similar vein, Trump also 
described America as “a nation of builders. We built the Empire State Building in just one year – 
is it not a disgrace that it can now take 10 years just to get a permit approved for a simple road… 
together, we can reclaim our building heritage. We will build new roads, bridges, highways… 
and we will do it with American heart, American hands, and American grit” (White House, 
2018). 
Unsurprisingly, Putin made numerous comparisons between the Soviet Union and the 
Russia he governed. He frequently did so to highlight the successes of his government and 
policies. He also made references to some of Russia’s historical experiences. 
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In 2004, Putin stated that “we live in a time that follows the collapse of a vast and great 
state… but despite  all the difficulties, we were able to preserve the core of what was once the 
vast Soviet Union…” (2004). This connection to the past reappeared in the 2012 Federal 
Assembly speech in which Putin stressed the importance of  “[preserving] the historical military 
memory of the Fatherland…” since the “morale of our Armed Forces is held up by traditions, by 
a living connection to history…” This formed part of a greater Russian identity that “[valued] the 
unique experience passed on to us by our forefathers…” as “Russia developed as a multi-ethnic 
nation… bonded by the Russian people, Russian language, and Russian culture… uniting us…” 
(2012).  
In his 2016 Federal Assembly speech, Putin emphasized that “Russian society… needs an 
objective, honest and deep-reaching analysis…” of the country’s history, specifically the 1917 
revolutions. He acknowledged the experiences as “common history” that needs “[to be treated] 
with respect” and that “the thorny road our country has travelled… is all their [son’s] native, 
inalienable heritage” (2016).  
By 2018, Putin started making positive comparisons between Soviet achievements and 
the accomplishments of modern Russia. He devoted several paragraphs describing Russia’s 
economic successes, such as increased port capacity, trade routes, agricultural production, and 
industrial projects that exceeded Soviet high-water marks (2018). Importantly, in this same 
speech, Putin detailed Russia’s military resurgence since the loss of a considerable amount of 
territory, economic capacity, and military equipment with the Soviet collapse. According to 
Putin, the weakness created by the Soviet loss of “44.6% of its military capability due to the 
division of the Soviet Armed Forces…” invited aggression by the country’s adversaries. The 
following paragraphs then described Russia’s modern military projects, specifically the 
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development of strategic weapons and missiles capable of defeating American missile defense. 
After describing several weapons in detail, he claimed that “everything I have described… is the 
result of the last several years, the product of dozens of research institutes… young 
professionals…” who “are our true heroes…” These developments will “make any potential 
aggressor think twice…” (2018). 
Although both Trump and Putin championed conservative visions for their respective 
countries, with Trump going so far as to claim he will “make America great again,” neither made 
any noticeable effort to make a logical connection between their actions and that of their 
countries’ pasts. Trump could have capitalized on a long, well-documented history of American 
exceptionalism but rarely made any references to the past except to highlight very specific, and 
shallow, examples. Similarly, Putin limited his acknowledgement of Russia’s past to recognizing 
the challenges that shaped the country’s modern form and to compare his achievements to that of 
previous chapters in Russia’s history. Although both men appeared to cherish some kind of 
idealized past, neither articulated any clear picture of what it looked like, and how it might 
inform a way forward for their countries. 
Appeal to Tribal Identity 
Appeals to various tribal identities formed a great portion of President Trump’s speeches 
and fit prominently within his messaging. Trump appealed to tribal identities on multiple levels, 
including class, race, religion, and nationality. 
In his One Hundred Days speech, Trump stated that he “[knows] how the game works in 
Washington and on Wall Street,” seeing how “[the politicians] rigged the rules of the game 
against everyday Americans.” He cited the alleged efforts of the “Washington establishment… to 
stop our campaign” as evidence that the “campaign represents the kind of change that only 
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arrives once-in-a-lifetime” (Peters & Woolley, 2016). Trump claimed that the “FBI and the 
Justice Department covered up [Hillary Clinton’s] crimes” (Peters & Woolley, 2016). He further 
alleged that the “dishonest, mainstream media” protects Clinton because they “lie and fabricate 
stories” to make him look bad (Peters & Woolley, 2016). He then appealed to the listeners, 
claiming that “if they can fight somebody like me who has unlimited resources… just look at 
what they can do to you… the violation of religious liberties… the theft of your second 
amendment…”  (Peters & Woolley, 2016). By 2019, Trump had started to warn of the perils of 
socialism, declaring that “… we are alarmed by new calls to adopt socialism in our country. 
America was founded on liberty and independence… we are born free and we will stay free… 
we renew our resolve that America will never be a socialist country” (White House, 2019). After 
winning the 2016 election, Trump declared at his inauguration that “… we are not merely 
transferring power from one administration to another… but we are transferring power from 
Washington D.C. and giving it back to you, the American people.” He further proclaimed that 
“the forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer.” (Peters & Woolley, 
2017). He had earlier declared his campaign to “an incredible and great movement made up of 
millions of hard working men and women who love their country…” (CNN, 2016).” 
In addition to political differences in class, Trump also highlighted economic differences. 
In the 2018 State of the Union speech, he declared “the era of economic surrender” to be over 
(White House, 2018).  
Race and national origin played a major role in Trump’s public speeches. He focused 
significantly on terrorism and immigration, which in practice meant othering Muslims and 
Hispanics. In his inauguration speech, Trump claimed that he “will unite the civilized world 
against Radical Islamic Terrorism, which we will eradicate completely from the face of the 
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Earth” (2017). In the 2017 State of the Union speech, Trump stated he would “[take] strong 
measures to protect our nation from radical Islamic terrorism…” which he connected to 
immigration by falsely claiming that “the vast majority of individuals convicted of terrorism and 
terrorism-related offenses since 9/11 came here from outside…” He asserted that “we cannot 
allow a beachhead of terrorism to form… we cannot allow our nation to become a sanctuary for 
extremists” (2017). 
When giving his 2019 Border National Emergency speech, Trump said, “We are talking 
about the invasion of our country with drugs, with human traffickers, with all types of criminals 
and gangs.” He further stated that “… we have an invasion of drugs, invasion of gangs, invasion 
of people and its unacceptable” He justified the declaration of his national emergency by 
concluding that “… we are declaring [the national emergency] for virtual invasion purposes – 
drugs, traffickers, and gangs” (The Atlantic, 2019). 
Trump occasionally tied immigration and terrorism together, declaring in the 2018 State 
of the Union speech that the visa lottery and chain migration made possible attempted terrorist 
attacks in New York City (White House, 2018). He declared in the previous speech that, “We 
cannot allow a beachhead of terrorism to form inside America” and “allow our nation to become 
a sanctuary for extremists” (Peters & Woolley, 2017). 
On rare occasion, Trump made an appeal to a broader American identity by embracing 
American exceptionalism and patriotism. In the 2017 State of the Union speech, he stated, “I am 
asking all citizens to embrace this renewal of the American spirit… believe in yourselves, 
believe in your future, and believe, once more, in America” (Peters & Woolley, 2017). At the 
next State of the Union in 2018, he said that “Each test has forged new American heroes to 
remind us who we are, and to show us what we can be” (White House, 2018). He continued by 
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stating that, “Over the last year, the world has seen what we always knew: that no people on 
Earth are so fearless, or daring, or determined as Americans… let us… recognize that the state of 
our Union is strong because our people are strong” (White House, 2018). In the 2019 State of the 
Union speech, he said, “In the 20th century, America saved freedom, transformed science, and 
redefined the middle class standard of living for the entire world to see… now we must step 
boldly and bravely into the next chapter of this great American adventure…” (White House, 
2019). He closed the speech by saying that “We must choose whether we will squander our 
inheritance – or whether or will proudly declare that we are Americans. We do the incredible. 
We defy the impossible. We conquer the unknown” (White House, 2019). 
Trump characteristically personalized the appeal to tribal identity, going so far as to 
declare in 2016 that, “I am your voice!” (Peters & Woolley, 2016). He purported his goal to be 
“to liberate our citizens from the crime and terrorism and lawlessness that threatens their 
communities” and to “completely rebuild our depleted military…” because “America is a nation 
of believers, dreamers, and strivers that is being led by a group of censors, critics, and cynics…” 
(Peters & Woolley, 2016). 
Unsurprisingly, the appeals also emphasized the importance of unity. In his inauguration 
speech, he stated that “American carnage stops right here and stops right now. We are one nation 
– and their pain is our pain. Their dreams are our dreams; and their success will be our success. 
We share one heart, one home, and one glorious destiny” and that “at the bedrock of our politics 
will be a total allegiance to the United States of America, and through our loyalty to our country, 
we will rediscover our loyalty to each other”  (Peters & Woolley, 2017). In an attempt to hedge 
against the divisiveness caused by his own rhetoric and proposed politics, he also claimed that 
“We must speak our minds openly, debate our disagreements honestly, but always pursue 
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solidarity.” Near the end of the speech, he stated that “… whether we are black or brown or 
white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots… and we all salute the same great American 
flag” (Peters & Woolley, 2017). 
Vladimir Putin had a softer appeal to tribal identity by attempting to mobilize people 
through populism. In 2016, he stated that it is “unacceptable to drag the grudges, anger, and 
bitterness of the past into our life today…” and that Russians must “remember that we are a 
single people, a united people, and we have only one Russia” (2016). In 2019, he had declared 
that “People are at the core of the national projects, which are designed to bring about a new 
quality of life for all generations” (Kremlin, 2019). He highlighted the main goal of “preserving 
our nation, which means providing all-around support to families… family, childbirth, 
procreation, and respect for the elderly have always served as a powerful moral framework for 
Russia and its multi-ethnic people…” (Kremlin, 2019). 
Trump made regular appeals to tribal identity using political, economic, and racialized 
language to appeal to various parts of the American public he considered essential to continued 
political success. He first attempted to separate himself from the elites in the Democratic Party 
by casting doubt upon their patriotism, legitimacy, and competency while promoting a vision of 
himself as champion of the American underclass. He also regularly referred to an “invasion” of 
America by criminals and illegal immigrants, eroding confidence in public safety. He crafted a 
view of the world in which [white] Americans were besieged by outside groups looking to 
destroy the American nation. 
In contrast, appeals to tribal identity did not feature significantly in Putin’s speeches. 
Although he made occasional calls to a mild form of Russian nationalism linked to the country’s 
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security and prestige, he made few appeals on the basis of racialized or political language that 
defined out- and in-groups.  
Response: the Call for Authoritarianism 
Neither Trump nor Putin made explicitly calls for authoritarianism. However, both 
articulated visions that challenged commonly accepted democratic norms. Given the need to 
balance public perceptions and temper both domestic and international condemnation, both 
individuals crafted public images that attempted to portray their views and actions as consistent 
with democratic government, despite evidence suggesting otherwise. 
President Trump focused on satisfying his political base, often at the expense of the rest 
of the electorate. On August 07, 2017, he tweeted that “… Supreme Court pick, economic 
enthusiasm, deregulation & so much more have driven Trump base even close together. Will 
never change!” (@realDonaldTrump). On December 24, 2017, he tweeted that the “Fake News 
refuses to talk about how Big and how Strong our BASE is… nobody is going to beat us” 
(@realDonaldTrump). Trump rarely made appeals to negotiation, bipartisanship, and 
compromise, except to accuse his opponents of failing to live up to these expectations.  
Additionally, as noted by Jane Chong in the The Atlantic (2020), Trump articulated a 
“strange and dangerous” idea about his “absolute right” to conduct specific actions. Between 
May 2017 and November 2019, Trump used this term five times. On May 16, 2017, in response 
to criticism about his release of classified information to senior Russian officials, Trump tweeted 
“As President I wanted to share with Russia.. which I have the absolute right to do…” 
(@realDonaldTrump). On June 04, 2018, Trump tweeted, “As has been stated by numerous legal 
scholars, I have the absolute right to PARDON myself…” (@realDonaldTrump). Again, in 
defense of his conduct, on April 13, 2019, Trump tweeted that “I never offered Pardons to 
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Homeland Security Officials, never ordered anyone to close our Southern Border (although I 
have the absolute right to do so…)” (@realDonaldTrump). On October 03, 2019, Trump tweeted 
that “As President of the United States, I have an absolute right, perhaps even a duty, to 
investigate, or have investigated, CORRUPTION, and that would include asking, or suggesting, 
other Countries to help us out!” (@realDonaldTrump). In response to his harassment and 
eventual dismissal of former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, Trump tweeted, in 
part… “It is a U.S. President’s absolute right to appoint ambassadors” (@realDonaldTrump). 
As described in previous sections of this chapter, Putin focused on strengthening the 
capabilities of the state in response to the articulated crises. As late as 2016, Putin claimed that 
the “course of developing the political system, the institutions of direct democracy, and of 
making elections more competitive is completely justified…” In the same speech, he claimed 
that the “State Duma has bolstered its role as a representative body and the legislative branch of 
power’s authority has strengthened in general” (2016). These nods to democratic governance 
contrast with the documented experience in Russia identifying Putin’s consolidation of power as 
described in earlier chapters. However, later in this same speech, Putin rhetorically asked “is it 
possible to achieve major strategic goals in fragmented society?” He also asked if “we can 
develop successfully on the shaky foundation of a weak state and apathetic government 
controlled from abroad…” (2016). These questions betray a skepticism of democratic 
governance that embraces diverse political agendas and a multi-polar civil society capable of 
peacefully managing competing interests.  
Neither Trump nor Putin made any explicit references to pursuing an authoritarian 
political project. However, the whole body of their speeches suggest a skepticism of democratic 
governance and power sharing. Trump formulated a response that centered on his personal action 
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and power with little regard for ethical norms and legal considerations. He also celebrated the 
strength of his political basis and connected his actions to their well-being. Putin formulated a 
response that focused on centralizing the state apparatus while making rhetorical concessions to 
democratic governance, going so far as to describe ways in which he claims to have strengthened 
the role of the legislative branch. However, his views expressed elsewhere suggest skepticism 
with the viability of a society that ideologically or political fragmented. Instead, he forwards a 
view of a Russia united behind its history, language, and values. 
Nevertheless, Trump could barely disguise his disregard for democratic norms even 
without explicitly calling for some variant of dictatorship. In defense of his ethically and legally 
questionable conduct, he several times invoked an “absolute right” to carry himself in that way, 
as if it somehow insulated his behavior from review or reproach. Even if Trump did not 
articulate a specific authoritarian program, his primal instinct to defend and center himself at all 
costs produces the same outcome.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
In an article in Foreign Policy magazine in September 2019, former staff member on the 
U.S. Secretary of State’s policy planning staff Charles Edel, wrote that “there is an ongoing 
assault on [American] democratic norms and values, which has led to the coarsening of the U.S. 
social fabric and the erosion of unspoken… norms that provide the guardrails of self-
government” (2019). When Donald Trump declared his candidacy for president of the United 
States, it garnered mixed reaction: laughter and mockery, alarm and concern, and also inspiration 
and pride. As his campaign gained momentum, his policy proposals becoming clearer, the 
contradictions in public perception and political differences became more acute. Trump entered 
the White House after eight years of relative stability secured by his predecessor, Barack Obama, 
who inherited a country gripped by economic crisis and mired in seemingly unending wars. 
Nevertheless, Trump’s rhetoric reflected a view of a broken and cowered America requiring 
renewal.  
While the drama of American politics unfolded, Russian president Vladimir Putin had 
been in power for almost 20 years. He too had entered office during a time of crisis, only the 
second Russian president since the Soviet collapse dismembered the latest incarnation of the 
Russian empire. The turmoil of the term of the first president, Boris Yeltsin, provided Putin with 
an opportunity to move Russia towards democratization and international integration, a promise 
hoped for by Russophiles in the West. However, as Putin consolidated political power and 
stabilized the state and economy, it became clear he relied upon authoritarianism to keep the 
whole apparatus together. By 2019, Russia had invaded two of its neighbors, Georgia and 
Ukraine, murdered dozens of journalists, used weapons of mass destruction to kill defectors 
abroad, and asphyxiated the nascent Russian civil society. This resulted in economic sanctions 
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against the country as well the expulsion of dozens of its diplomatic personnel from Europe and 
the United States. 
In the background, the global superstructure also faced challenges. Technological 
advances enabled the connection of people and ideas around the world, giving rise to seemingly 
spontaneous grassroots uprisings, like the Arab Spring. Global scientists also warned of the 
impending danger of climate change that will force changes on the international political and 
economic order as coastlines creep on dense urban centers, droughts depress agricultural 
production, and resource conflicts become more intense. The resultant disruptions, appearing as 
mass migrations, famines, and water scarcity, among many other challenges, promise to confront 
every level of human society. 
The aspirations of an unending democratic future provided by the conclusion of the Cold 
War disappeared in the hardships of the War on Terrorism, global economic crisis, cultural 
upheaval, environmental crisis, and the re-emergence of great power politics. Both Trump and 
Putin occupy positions to decisively influence how the world will respond to these events. Their 
spoken word givens insight into how they have responded, and intend to respond, to these 
matters. 
The upheaval across all domains of world stability – political, economic, cultural, 
environmental – defines the manifestation of a new era of Metamodernism. Vermeulen and van 
den Akker described Metamodernism as an “oscillation between a typically modern commitment 
and a markedly postmodern detachment” (2010). Tuner noted that Metamodernism contained a 
“pragmatic romanticism unhindered by ideological anchorage” (2011); in other words, a 
yearning for an idealized past without ideological preconditions for action in the present. The 
demolition of “ideological anchorage” corresponds with Abramson’s recognition of a “collapse 
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of distance” and the emergence of “multiple subjectivities” (2015), creating a cultural and 
informational ecosystem consisting of constant collision and movement between contradictory 
impulses. Elites and state actors, in this context, can more effectively mobilize political power by 
actively shaping these subjectivities and bypassing established power structures. 
Metamodernism represents the culmination of postmodernism’s deconstruction of the 
center and its pluralistic diffusion of power. Soon after World War Two, Heidegger recognized a 
coming clash of subjectivities in a “struggle of world views” (1954). Foucault soon followed, 
describing “a conception of power which replaces… the law with the viewpoint of the objective” 
(1976). Lyotard depicted an “an immanent… network… which [is] in constant flux” because of 
an “erosion of the legitimacy of the principle of knowledge” (1979). Derrida further asserted that 
“in the absence of a center… everything becomes discourse” (1966). Nearing the end of the Cold 
War, with its fixed ideological conflict, Baudrillard asserted that the distance of symbols from 
their original meaning created a situation where “the real is no longer what it used to be,” 
replaced by a “proliferation of myths… and signs…” (1983).  Together, these philosophers 
described a world in which subjectivities replace anchored narratives. Postmodernism created an 
epistemological chasm to be filled by Metamodernism. 
As postmodernism demolished the intellectual structure of the West, Russia had long 
represented a post-modern polity. Dobrenko described a country “utterly distracted by its own 
thwarted identity complex” (2011). Ephstein identified “the production of reality” as a historical 
Russian practice (1995). As early as 1839, a visitor to Russsia, the Marquis de Custine, labelled 
Russia a “country of fictions” where “words matter more than reality” (2014). Dobrenko further 
argued that Russia regularly overcame crisis with disguise, with the modern materialization 
simulating a ‘market economy’, ‘democracy’, and ‘postmodernism’” (2011).  
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Both the United States and modern Russia have arrived at the metamodern moment 
through their own respective historical processes. But the process for both included political, 
economic, and social turmoil; the War on Terrorism, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 2008 
Great Recession, and so on. Combined with the structural instability instigated by technological 
developments, environmental crisis, and, chiefly, postmodern’s deconstruction, the metamodern 
era has ushered in a chapter as uncertain as almost any before it. 
The methodology used by this examination to understand the impact of Metamodernism 
on elite decision-making consisted of the qualitative content analysis of public statements made 
by President Donald Trump of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia. The 
research focused on four primary themes: crisis as pretext, the past as utopia, appeal to tribal 
identity, and response. These themes broadly cover how the two leaders frame crisis and intend 
to use it to mobilize political power.  
The sample chosen – 31 speeches and 52 tweets – represent the points in which the 
leaders made contact with the public, making known their views and intentions, at least as 
publicly stated. In order to justify their policies, how they frame their actions and intentions for 
public consumption provides insight into the ways in which they view the various crises 
perceived to be affecting their respective countries. 
The Types of Metamodern Presidents? 
Both Trump and Putin represented aspects of Metamodernism in their own idiosyncratic 
ways; Trump embracing demagoguery with Putin practicing a more subtle conservative 
nationalism. Despite their differences in methods, both articulated an idealized vision of an 
autocratic, or at the very least an anti-democratic, future to be fulfilled by the mobilization of a 
loyal, if sometimes radicalized, tribal base. 
  84 
 
Metamodernism describes a world engrossed in crisis. Populations the world over suffer 
from varying degrees of assault by war, terrorism, economic instability, social disorder, and 
environmental disaster. Ostensibly stable and centered societies, like those in the United States 
and Russia, which have significantly entrenched self-proscribed identities about holding a central 
place in world affairs, also face these problems. Not conditioned to this kind of challenge, 
Metamodernism implies, these societies, while perhaps possessing the material means to 
navigate them relatively safely, do not have the intellectual or psychological capacities to process 
them since they so deeply confront long held and cherished beliefs. 
Although both Trump and Putin exploit crisis to their own political advantage, they do so 
differently. Trump specifically exploits the feeling of crisis, but substantially reframes crisis to 
his benefit; to the extent that he regularly traffics in long dismissed conspiracy theories. His 
campaign to politically neuter Joe Biden by promoting an elaborate conspiracy of corruption and 
foreign political interference centered on Ukraine epitomizes the highest extreme of crisis 
exploitation. Trump has thoroughly cast off all “ideological anchorage”, even long established 
bipartisan political norms, inviting incredible resistance from his opposition. In defining such 
extravagant and existential crises, Trump has laid the intellectual framework to justify any action 
he decides to pursue, going so far as to identify his critics and political opponents as traitors.  
In contrast, Putin articulated a Russian-centered view of crisis that many found 
reasonable, given the experiences in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse. He made 
acknowledgements about Soviet and Russian weaknesses and described them in a language 
commonly accepted by others. However, whereas Trump emphasized the threat to a narrowly 
defined vision of America and Americas, Putin focused on the idea of a strong, secure Russia, 
washing over any internal differences that might exist.  
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The contrasts between how Trump and Putin characterized crisis say as much about their 
personalities as it does about the opportunities for authoritarian personalities to exploit 
insecurities and instability. Trump used the opportunity to further deconstruct institutions and 
norms that challenged his person. This created a dynamic of power centered on Trump himself, 
rather than the office he occupied; weakening the constitutional order and further fueling the 
sense of crisis. Putin, for his part, used the occasion to construct a state that, while also centered 
on his person, possessed increased capabilities over time and that increased confidence in the 
resolution of the crises articulated by him. 
The lack of discussion by either Trump or Putin about their view of an idealized past 
suggests that one does not exist and that both presidents view the past as a prop to justify 
political action. Neither president articulated a coherent political philosophy that might provide a 
framework for their policies and connect them to their countries’ respective pasts. This also 
suggests that the conservative identities they have cultivated may in fact be rootless, which 
contradict the fundamental premise of conservatism and contribute to the sense of crisis that 
dominates the metamodern era. 
To the extent that both Trump and Putin represent Metamodernism, they both did so in 
idiosyncratic ways; perhaps representing two different branches of the same philosophical path. 
For his part, Trump personified a deeply cynical, rash, and egocentric version of Metamodernism 
that knowingly sought to exploit the insecurities, vulnerabilities, and divisions of the public to 
advance the interests of a narrow circle of elites centered on Trump himself. In nearly every 
aspect of crisis, he managed to re-frame the issue to what?? that personally benefited him 
politically, and perhaps even financially. He further exacerbated crisis by closely embracing 
specific tribal identities (namely white Christians) at the expense of all others; going so far as to 
  86 
 
question the underlying legitimacy of the American constitutional system. Lastly, where 
challenged about whether he should do something, he often resorted to the common authoritarian 
defense that he could do it. 
In contrast, Putin presented a more measured version of Metamodernism that also 
recognized and advantageously defined specific crises. Even as Putin constructed an 
authoritarian state, he did so in a methodical way, and centered its power on an alliance of 
security officials and oligarchs, rather than exclusively in his own person. After almost two 
decades in power, the full arc of Putin’s actions can be examined. Putin responded to the 
metamodern era by building a state in accordance with his vision. 
Despite wrapping themselves up in national identity and patriotism, neither Trump or 
Putin articulated in their speeches any deep understanding or appreciation of their countries’ 
histories. One would expect conservative movements that idealized a utopian-like past to place 
more emphasis on their national histories, even if selectively imagined, and offer a narrative that 
expresses their movement as a logical extension of some kind national destiny. Although they 
selectively highlighted important national achievements, neither put forward any kind of 
coherent framework to restore an idealized past. This epistemological and ideological break from 
history, an opening filled in by imagination free of “ideological anchorage”, calls into question 
the extent to which either can be defined as ‘conservative’ – after all, neither pursued the 
restoration of national traditions and customs. Trump regularly received criticism for his 
disregard of American political norms and traditions. For his part, Putin has not pursued either 
monarchism or communism; the only two political traditions with any substance in Russian 
history. The obvious tension between these leaders’ self-proclaimed conservatism and the 
rejection of their countries’ respective historical traditions can only be resolved by recognizing 
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their attempt to assert a narrow tribal identity and projecting that identity both backwards into 
history and forward into the future. In this way, the absence of any serious dialogue about an 
idealized past reflects a metamodern subjectivity attempting to reframe historical fact. Historical 
revisionism, or even mythical construction, therefore best describes a metamodern president. 
Likewise, this same juxtaposition may explain the lack of explicit calls for 
authoritarianism even as both leaders destroy democratic obstacles to their power and work to 
build political arrangements that reinforce autocracy. Even as Trump deconstructs American 
democratic norms and Putin uses democratic language as a political prop, both likely recognize 
that overtly championing authoritarianism may damage their political programs. Both presidents 
must navigate the subjective identities of both their supporters and their opposition to maintain a 
stable political coalition capable of implementing the autocratic project in practice. 
This examination therefore comes to the point where it becomes necessary to propose a 
framework for the views shared by Trump and Putin. Trump’s articulation can be defined as 
deconstructive Metamodernism, where he actively exploited crisis to deconstruct a state and 
norms to replace them with authoritarian political power. To this end, Trump mobilized anger 
and resent to advance his agenda. In contrast, Putin’s framework can be defined as constructive 
Metamodernism, where he exploits crisis to build a state centered on authoritarian political 
power. Putin appeared to frequently invoke patriotic themes to inspire loyalty and obedience as a 
part of this effort. A counter-factual placing Trump and Putin in each other’s positions might 
suggest that either would fail to achieve what the other has accomplished and highlight the 
differences in their methods. Trump’s singular focus on his personal fortune and compulsive 
behavior would make it difficult for him to extract a country from a crisis as severe as Russia’s 
experiences in the early 1990s. He would be more comparable to the first Russian president, 
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Boris Yeltsin, whose mismanagement only heightened Russia’s problems. In contrast, Putin’s 
obsession with stability and constitutional order, to be solved by authoritarianism, would make 
him an unlikely candidate to deconstruct the institutions of relatively stable state with strong 
political norms. The agendas and strategies, as much as they can be defined as either, adopted by 
Trump and Putin would not be possible without the conditions of Metamodernism that shattered 
the sense of stability and security among their targeted audiences. 
The sampled speeches of President Trump illustrate a consistent theme of delegitimizing 
and dismantling political obstacles, including rivals, ideas and norms, relationships, and 
institutions. Such a campaign appears designed exclusively to protect and promote the political 
fortunes of Trump’s person, even at the expense of the very office he holds. Should Trump 
supporters genuinely desire an authoritarian form of government, it would be more effective to 
replace Trump with a political figure who did not so regularly mobilize opposition to his agenda 
and the powers of his office. Trump’s actions have called into the question the powers of the 
President, which undermines any project intended to concentrate that office’s power. The 
importance of this distinction between power in Trump’s person and the power of Trump’s office 
becomes evident when examined through a lens of deconstructionism. Trump seeks to center 
himself in a world in which [perceived] crisis, technology, and subjective identity of thoroughly 
decentered traditional hubs of power, influence, and culture. This process also involved 
dismantling the remaining institutional and ideological pillars in opposition to his project by 
reframing or inventing crisis. 
In contrast, Putin, in the absence of a stable political state, aimed to replace a vacuum 
with his own political vision. In the absence of authority, Putin sought to create one by 
constructing a state around him. His specific experiences and ideological preferences, developed 
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during his time as a Soviet security officer, shaped the kind of state he envisioned. Nevertheless, 
even with real crisis, Putin variously emphasized one crisis or another depending on 
circumstances. In the early years, circumstances and emergencies appeared forced on him, but as 
his power consolidated, he could choose which problems gained his attention. By the end of the 
period of study for this dissertation, Putin increased his focus on international security, 
particularly Russia’s standing vis-à-vis the United States.  
Despite their differences in the approaches by Trump and Putin, both energetically used 
crisis to their advantage and, to varying degrees, sought to mobilize others on the basis of tribal 
identity. 
The failure of the universal ideologies like socialism, capitalism, liberalism, and even to 
some extent nationalism, has created a situation in which political leaders, without ideological 
anchorage, can shamelessly exploit social discord and technological connection to put forward 
an ideological promiscuous and bland authoritarianism. Without the necessity of forming any 
kind of rational philosophy to govern action, metamodern leaders, exemplified by Trump, can 
say whatever they determine to be in their self-interest without consequence. Possessing 
sophisticated information tools, they can deliver contradictory messages to targeted segments of 
the population to mobilize support. Trump’s twitter handle is unironically @realDonaldTrump 
despite the amount of falsehoods he promotes and the absence of any ideological conviction; 
perhaps the embodiment of Metamodernism estrangement from a knowable reality.  They can 
dispense with any form of logical action except for the one that ultimately drives them: power. 
Power justifies itself. The speeches sampled above provide a testimony to the making of a 
metamodern president. 
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Significance of Research 
The research will further the evaluation of the political conditions of the United States 
and Russia that gave rise to authoritarian presidents despite institutional, cultural, and civic 
opposition by scrutinizing the language used by Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin to mobilize 
political support. This scrutiny isolated the specific themes and codes emphasized by the leaders 
that they feel most substantially move their supporters. By digesting the texts and speeches of 
these presidents, analysis substantiates to what extent these leaders present the triumph of the 
Metamodern will, potentially signifying the end of modern democratic history. Understanding 
this thread of Metamodernism enables a deeper and richer understanding of the larger forces that 
work for and against democratic governance and identifies areas of potential conflict. 
Given that conflict features predominantly in the concepts of Metamodernism, it naturally 
suggests that an analysis through the frame of Metamodernism will have bearing on the theories 
of conflict and its resolution. Dean Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim defined conflict as a “perceived 
divergence of interest” and a “belief that the parties’ current aspirations are incompatible” (p. 8, 
2004). The identity crisis and tribalism at the center of Metamodernism, described throughout 
this examination, correlates with the “perceived divergence of interest”, which subsequent 
chapters illustrate in greater detail. Pruitt and Kim go on to define “interests” as “people’s 
feelings about what is basically desirable”, where others have used “values” or “needs” (p. 15). 
In the chapter discussing the nature and sources of conflict, including its principal components, 
the authors discuss the conditions, relations, identities that contribute to conflict. The ways in 
which national leaders, using the power of the pulpit as well as any political powers they 
exercise, manipulate conflict conditions for their own personal gain may further understanding of 
how conflicts emerge or escalate. These individuals can create or exploit situations in which they 
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possess asymmetric advantages over their perceived adversaries, whether defined legally, 
politically, economically, or socially. In this way, metamodermism provides both an ideological 
and strategic opening for opportunistic leaders to exploit.  
In a world of increasing complexity, not only in the sophistication of economic and 
political systems, but also in subjective identities and how these identities relate to each other 
and shape public preferences, an exploration of Metamodernism also raises important questions 
about the rational actor model. This process assumes that organizations, including governments 
and political parties, have a rational decision-making process capable of setting goals and 
implementing strategies to achieve them (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010).  These assumptions 
frequently form an unspoken basis of conflict resolution theories that seek to build a methodical 
process for understanding conflicts and finding ways to mitigate or end them. However, the 
identities that people assume, how they resolve tension between them, and how that manifests in 
larger social and political discourse, may not produce rational goals and strategies. Rather, it 
could produce sub-optimal strategies or call into the question the rationality of specific actors. 
This examination, which focused on the language used by Trump and Putin, provides a 
prospect to explore the way in which leaders deliberately manipulate, and sometimes exacerbate, 
a crisis situation for their own advantage. These kinds of actors, which spoil attempts for conflict 
resolution, represent a major obstacle to solving problems. Examining how they undertake such a 
campaign may allow for the development of strategies to mitigate their detrimental impact on 
conflict resolution. 
Both concepts of Metamodernism proposed here (destructive and constructive) advance 
understanding of conflict resolution in several ways. First, it suggests that the structure of 
conflict may be created or shaped through asymmetric power relationships. Trump and Putin 
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hold disproportionate power and through their speeches (and Trump’s tweets), they can shape the 
contours of a conflict (or create one) by words alone. Second, it demonstrates that practitioners 
in conflict resolution should not take the good faith of others for granted and be cognizant that 
others may find advantages in continuing conflict. Third, and most importantly, it suggests that 
there may not be rational resolutions to conflict available; the structure of a conflict may in itself 
be irrational making intractable conflict inevitable. This almost wholly depends on the intentions 
of the stronger party in asymmetric power relationships; the conditions of the metamodern era, 
such as the collapse of distance and the fragmentation of identities, only contribute to the 
underlying paradoxical logic of the conflict. Whereas traditional conflict resolution practice 
largely assumes rational actors, and bases its recommendations on this fact, the visions 
articulated by Trump, and to a lesser extent Putin, suggest that this assumption does not always 
hold true. 
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 1, typologizing elite behavior within the context of 
Metamodernism can also inform international relations theories and understanding authoritarian 
tendencies for conflict. There could emerge from that examination a better understanding of the 
consequences of elite behavior both domestically and internationally. 
With states, like societies, contingent upon subjectivities and perspectives, they possess a 
unique fragility as a consequence of their position between domestic and international systems 
and processes. The features of Metamodernism – crisis, collapsing distances, and so on – all 
directly assault the presumptive sovereignty of states. If state identity also relies upon the 
formulation of an other to not only define a state’s spatial existence but also its moral superiority 
and its political impulse, Metamodernism not only threatens to de-center both the United States 
and Russia, but also the state itself. Since states ultimately rely upon the exercise of power and 
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the use of interrogative violence to not only create its own sovereign exclusion but to also 
rejuvenate its own moral preeminence, policy determined by Metamodernist presidents such as 
Trump and Putin likely resort to authoritarianism, other-ism, and violence from a position of 
perceived weakness and not of strength. Whether crisis threatens the national whole or individual 
political power, the crisis represents not an opportunity to fulfill some idealized national value 
(such as republicanism, liberty, or fraternity), but instead an existential threat which justifies any 
excess and utmost exertion in response. Consequently, the ways in which Trump and Putin frame 
crisis appear to have a direct connection to how they perceive their respective countries: not as 
confident superpowers but as a gravely injured polities nursing a perceived victimization by a 
nebulously defined other.  
How states with perceived weaknesses but actual strength respond to this dissonance 
opens serious questions about international conflict and stability. This may trigger a cataclysmic 
death spiral in which every act of physical exertion to make a country great again diminishes its 
moral authority, thereby further de-centering it and inflating the distance between its perceived 
weakness and actual strength. David Rapkin and Dan Braaten (2009) argued that international 
legitimacy emerges from a “substantive base of shared values,” “constitutionalism…” defined as 
“open, accessible decision procedures” with “strategic restraint in the use of… power,” and 
“successful outcomes.” The instincts of Metamodernist presidents contradict this conception of 
international legitimacy, and in fact seek to actively confront it as a cosmopolitan other. The 
transition from one hegemonic power to another, or the emergence of a hegemonc contender, 
may produce a world war in which the fundamental questions of a state’s place is finally 
decided. Robert Gilpin (1988) defined a hegemonic war as a conflict in which “an unstable 
system [where] economic, technological, and other changes [erode] the… position of the 
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hegemonic state” with the outcome producing a “new international structure” (p. 592). He 
doubted that a “statesman would view the eventual gains from the great wars of history as 
commensurate with [their] eventual costs” but cautioned that “once a war, however limited, 
begins it can release powerful forces unforeseen by the instigators” (p. 613). Where the crises of 
the Metamodern era challenge the presumed hegemony of the United States; Trump’s reframing 
of national and international problems for his own political gain can potentially provide that 
spark that triggers a global conflagration.  
Complicating this matter further, leaders, particularly Trump, conflate personal interest 
with national interest as evidenced by how Trump has defined crises in the Metamodern era. 
Although two-level game theory makes assumptions about the characteristics of the actor 
evaluating the domestic and international outcomes and what positive outcomes can be 
produced, an authoritarian president that conceives personal political power to be in the state 
interest ignores those assumptions. This potentially has serious consequences for a state’s 
behavior, international security, and domestic tranquility. Such a president may make an 
international concession or undertake a military operation with serious international 
consequences (including death) but offers significant personal gain, such as monetary wealth or 
ego awards. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Trump promised Putin medical ventilators even as 
U.S. governors expressed concerns about a domestic shortage for American patients. (Business 
Insider, 2020). Trump also terminated America’s relationship with the World Health 
Organization, blaming it for the pandemic, even as the United States alone suffers from the 
catastrophic response of its government to the crisis (BBC, 2020). In both of these instances, 
Trump likely perceived personal political gain even while knowing the measurable and definite 
consequences of the citizens for whom he is responsible.  
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These tendencies make conflict resolution practices at all levels particularly difficult and 
may make conflicts more intractable. Conflict resolution theories, such as that articulated by 
Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall in Contemporary Conflict Resolution 
(2011), rely in part on accepted international systems, rational decision-makers, and good faith 
actors to produce effective if difficult conflict resolution mechanisms. The authors stated that 
their approach is “committed to combatting and overcoming inequalities and injustices 
worldwide, so that a fair wind as possible can be given to the life hopes and aspirations of the 
many…” and to promote “norms, techniques, tools, and institutions to make sure that [the world] 
remains predominantly non-violent” (p. 423). The authors hope that the next generation of 
conflict resolution practictioners embrace cosmopolitanism to form a basis for “global 
partnership for peacebuilding” and to inspire a sense of “shared humanity” that transcends tribal 
identities of such as “family, clan, ethnic group” and so on.  
But this seems increasingly unlikely in a Metamodern world in which the collision of 
subjectivities calls to power authoritarian responses that rely upon exacerbating sectional 
identities and destroying cooperative institutions to be replaced by personal authority. Theory 
and practice ultimately rely upon experience and observation that produce some level of 
predictability upon which can be predicated plans and intentions to shape conditions for some 
sought after outcome. Although this dissertation attempted to provide some level of 
measurability to the behavior of Trump and Putin, it found as much only to the extent that these 
actors behave in a narrowly defined self-interest, even at the expense of the collective good for 
which they hold some responsibility to protect. This self-interest exceeds that which has defined 
traditional political theories as early as Thucydides and Machiavelli, which some may write off 
as miscalculation or self-destructiveness, but which appear to be of a more serious kind than 
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what is normally expected of political actors, if only because there is a barely disguised attempt 
at pretense; but also because the actors invariably find themselves in a trap in which the only 
successful strategy is continued escalation which might ultimately result in exhaustion or 
destruction. Stability comes in part from a sense of security and confidence, neither of which can 
be comfortably held when relying upon evaluating the self-interest of an individual actor 
committed to a strategy of escalation, even if punctuated with tactical pauses. Empower this 
individual with a sophisticated political machine and place them at the top of a wary superpower, 
there emerges a volatile mix in which security and confidence cannot exist at any level for 
anyone. Personal expediency becomes exigency and exigency becomes policy. In such 
environment, there is no stability. This of course does not suggest the unsuitability of previous 
theory, but instead evidences an under-appreciated fraility. Processes and mechanicisms may 
effectively work in predictable systems with measureable connections between inputs and 
outputs, but Metamodernism’s contginencies and crises create, destroy, and recreate such 
connections at a remarkable pace; when weaponized by self-interested political actors armed 
with all the elements of national power and committed to continued escalation, one wonders how 
such a conflict would ever end. Herman Schmid (1968) characterized peace researchers as 
invested in an “ideology of internationalism” who have “learned how to solve conflicts, how to 
integrate a system, how to avoid manifest organized violence… and… believes that what is good 
for the system is in the long run good for its elements” (p. 229). This focus on  “control of the 
international system to prevent major breakdowns” and “integration of the international system 
to make it more stable” contradicts the aims of Metamodernist leaders helming ego-wounded 
superpowers intent on revolting against the impulses of the era to amalgamate global cultural, 
economic, and political systems.  
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Therefore, evaluating presidents within a Metamodern framework has deep consequences 
for conflict resolution theory and practice. This dissertation only goes so far as to suggest that 
these types of actors demand further evaluation as a new type addressed only in parts and not as 
a whole by previous theory. However, since the Metamodernist era calls into question the 
legitimacy and strength of long-standing norms and institutions, the practices that rely upon 
those those same norms and institutions must also be reassessed. The importance of this 
assessment becomes all the more evident as societies navigate through the nexus that confronts 
them. 
Charting the Way Forward: Lessons and Recommendations 
The examination suggests three paths forward for research and related recommendations: 
first, establishing a typology of leadership types that may provide a framework for understanding 
and predicting elite behavior; second, further discourse analysis on the such leaders’ remarks to 
elicit further information regarding their basis and consequences; and third, examining the 
fundamental assumptions and norms of conflict resolution in the context of Metamodernism. 
The previous sections suggested the potential existence of types of metamodern 
presidents, given the contextual situation of both Presidents Trump and Putin. Although they 
appeared to share similar aims, their speeches likely reflected the same desire but in different 
points on in the process in fulfilling those desires. Further research exploring the contours of a 
metamodern leader, what they might look like, and how they might behavior, could add to the 
body of knowledge on elite behavior within a time of unprecedented confluence of crises and 
technology. A primary research focus could be the further development of constructionist and 
deconstructionist metamodern as political concepts. Such exploration could identify specific 
practices or processes of implementation that highlight strategies that could mitigate the harm 
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such policies might impose. One research path could explore the construction of language and 
use of coded language by either President to measure its effect on public attitudes and political 
activities. This focus on communication could highlight how the digital bully pulpit, combined 
with the crisis language of a president in the metamodernist era, shapes political decision-making 
Secondly, this examination limited its study to providing a framework for coding selected 
language used by two leaders. Further research can focus on a deeper discourse analysis of these 
two individuals, of expanding the selection to include more of their remarks, analyzing the 
policies connected to their administrations within this context, or examining other leaders, either 
elites within the United States in Russia, or elites (including heads of state or government) in 
other countries. Such research might lead analysis into a direction of more fully developing 
collective understsanding of the conditions of the metamodern era and how political leaders 
respond to them. 
A third research path could use quantitative analysis to measure the extent to which the 
use of specific keywords have a correlation on political policy or public opinion. A quantitative 
approach could complement qualitive analysis by providing mathematical specificity to a 
complex idea and provide targeted solutions for identified problems. 
A fourth research approach could address the apparent absence of historical appreciation 
(or, the presence of mythical construction) in a metamodernist context that places emphasis on 
shifting subjectivities in constant proximal tension. This avenue may yield further insight into 
how leaders craft narratives in widening contingent spaces with collapsing distances. 
A fifth research path could explore Metamodernism in different contexts, such as an 
acute crisis (such as a pandemic) in comparison to a structural one (such as economic equality or 
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climate change), or in countries with weaker institutions and norms. These could provide 
opportunities to analyze the subject from different angles where context may impact outcomes. 
Lastly, as discussed in the previous section, Metamodernism challenges the established 
norms and institutions governing behavior in regards to conflict and peace. The contradictions 
and heighented escalations of the era depend less on mutually accepted systems and 
mechanisms; even as spatial and social distance decreases, dissonance increases as people 
embrance contingent subjectivities, some of which appear to be mutually exclusive. Developing 
mechanicisms that receive legitimacy from distinct parties that can barely agree on the same set 
of facts, much less find common values, can prove exceedingly difficult. The focus therefore 
should be on preventing peace-building from falling victim to Metamodernism’s tendency to 
reduce objects to signals that only reflect a transitory position in an elaborate matrix of noise and 
clutter.  
Testing the boundaries of Metamodernism can identify the limits of theory and, more 
practically, areas where the challenges of Metamodernism might prove overwhelming for 
pursuits of justice, peace, and conflict resolution.  
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